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Abstract
Over the past 30 years there has been an increase in socioeconomic inequities between 
Black and White persons in the United States. Some research suggests that political 
ideology, which in turn impacts political competition levels, may at least partially explain 
these disparities, though the body of academic literature in this area is sparse. Little is 
known about how Black political ideology is formed by perceptions of inequality. The 
purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of Black political ideology, 
political competition, and socioeconomic status to determine how political competition 
relates to social inequities between Blacks and Whites. The theoretical framework of the 
study was Lockean social contract theory. The overarching question guiding this study 
explored how competition could better defend natural rights to reduce social disparities 
and the obligations of government to equally protect, similarly to the protections of 
government historically extended to Whites. Multiple and multivariate regression models 
were developed using data from the 2010 General Social Survey, the 2010 American 
Community Survey, and the presidential election results of 2008. Results showed no 
significant relationship between Black beliefs of inequality with Black political ideology 
and that high political competition rates might contribute to the increasing BlackAVhite 
socioeconomic gaps. Contrary to economic competition models developed through 
Locke’s social contract, there was no evidence that political competition reduces 
socioeconomic inequities between Blacks and Whites. The implications for positive 
social change include education of policy makers that higher political competition rates in 
their states contribute to lower socioeconomic outcomes for Blacks.
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1Chapter 1 : Introduction to the Study 
Background of the Study
Generally, Black voters are a homogenous voting bloc (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). 
Since the late 1960s, Blacks have largely supported liberal. Democratic candidates and 
have not given scholars reason to examine their voting behavior (Kidd, Diggs, Farooq, & 
Murray, 2007). However, about only one in six Black voters now identify as liberal, 
whereas in the early 1970s, about 40% identified with that political ideology (Hajnal & 
Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee found that unemployed Blacks are 16% more likely to 
support Republican candidates over Democratic candidates.
Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) and Ghosh (2010) found that political 
competition related positively to economic growth in a state. In this study, I attempted to 
understand what the relationships of political competition might be with socioeconomic 
status for Blacks in the United States. I found evidence that suggested that higher levels 
of political competition have a negative relationship with annual household incomes for 
Blacks.
Although Blacks have made socioeconomic progress in the U.S., specifically in 
the growth of the Black middle class (Marsh, Darity, Cohen, Casper, & Salters, 2007), 
Black-White gaps exist today (Hunt, 2007). There are many variations of individualistic 
and structuralist explanations as to why socioeconomic gaps exist between Blacks and 
Whites (Hunt, 2007). Black families living in poverty have decreased “from 34% in 
1967 to 21% in 2001” (Attewell, Lavin, Domina, & Levey, 2004, p. 7). However, Blacks
2faced obstacles to the accumulation of wealth and increasing their socioeconomic status 
(SES) as compared to Whites (Hardaway & McLoyd, 2009).
Prior to industry’s decline, Blacks secured many of the blue-collar, manufacturing 
jobs (Sites & Parks, 2011). When recession occurs. Blacks seem to suffer the most 
economic setbacks as they rely on the manufacturing jobs that may be the first to be 
eliminated (Sites & Parks, 2011). Efforts to infuse communities with monies, such as 
venture capital, have higher returns than that of traditional investments; but, there are 
obstacles hampering these types of investments (Rubin, 2010).
Certain historical federal attempts to address structural issues, such as the Fair 
Employment Practice Committee (FEPC; 1941) contributed little to the opening of 
defense related jobs for Blacks (Sites & Parks, 2011). Additionally, the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA; 1977) encouraged private investment into minority 
communities until the act was weakened in 2005 (Rubin, 2010). The state promotion of 
minority business enterprises (MBEs), are government programs intended to secure 
success, but might actually inhibit growth once the organization has grown to large 
(Bates, 2009). However, MBEs have the potential to help create jobs in poor, minority 
communities (Bates, 2009).
There are differences in educational achievement in urban and rural schools (Lee, 
2002; Lee & Friedrich, 2007; Lewis, James, Hancock, & Hill-Jackson, 2008; Strayhorn,
2009). One attempt at educational reform known as Smaller Learning Communities 
(SLCs) has potential to improve educational outcomes (Lee & Friedrich, 2007).
However, there was an inverse relationship based on race; White students had positive
3correlations and Black students had negative correlations with the program (Lee & 
Friedrich, 2007). While, some low-income Black students recognize the importance of 
education, others may perceive opportunity for postsecondary education to be little or 
nonexistent (Payne, 2008). SES plays a role in determining educational aspirations in 
that the higher a student’s SES, the higher their educational aspirations (Strayhorn, 2009).
An aspect of the overall, structural explanation of the BlackAVhite SES gap 
involves the housing market (Hunt, 2007). In order to understand this, I reviewed the 
perceptions of discrimination and experiences of discrimination in the housing market. 
Programs meant to create more equal conditions for upward mobility such as the 
Gautreaux program from 1976 to 1998 and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) beginning 
in 1994 have had success insofar as upward mobility, but the researchers have concluded 
that many of those who received vouchers from the program moved to areas with slightly 
lower poverty levels than the neighborhoods they left (Wilson, 2010).
Changes in overall SES have resulted in positive change. Blacks have made SES 
progress in that Black families living in poverty deceased by 13% from 1967 to 2001 
(Attewell et ah, 2004) and have had growth in the middle class (Marsh et ah, 2007). 
However, substantial BlackAVhite SES gaps still exist (Hunt, 2007), representing a social 
problem.
Political party affiliation can be related to perception. Republican efforts to 
mobilize members of Black communities in conjunction with social and moral issues 
have failed. The Republican Party is perceived, by many in Black communities, as the
4party for Whites, while the Democratic Party is considered the more inclusive party 
(McDaniel & Ellison, 2008).
Lewis (2000) pointed out that Black conservatism is difficult to define; but, it can 
be generalized. That is. Black conservatives believe in individual achievement, 
capitalism, high moral standards, and a focus on accomplishments rather than obstacles 
(Lewis, 2000). A majority of Blacks have a strong religious commitment and their 
religious beliefs are more traditional than most other races (Mangum, 2008). This 
religious commitment is categorized as Black religious conservatism, as they have similar 
views as White conservatives on issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the role of faith 
in public (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008, p. 180). However, many Black religious 
conservative voters remain committed to the Democratic Party (Mangum, 2008).
Since the 1960s, Blacks have supported Democratic public officials (Hajnal &
Lee, 2007). However, Black voters are not has homogenous as popularly advertised 
(Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee pointed out that these voters do not fit necessarily 
onto the traditional linear scale because their decisions in voting might be more 
complicated than most.
Historically, Blacks have maintained a more structuralist explanation of inequality 
compared to Whites, who have had a more individualistic explanation (Taylor & Merino, 
2011). Individualism rests on the concept that all people have the following inalienable 
rights: life and liberty, the sanctities of private property, and freedom to dissent (Asumah 
& Perkins, 2000, p. 53). Structuralism attributes historical or institutional causes to lack 
of achievement (Kluegel, 1990, p. 512). Blacks and Whites continue to have differences
5insofar as structuralist explanations but have been coming closer in individualism beliefs 
(Taylor & Merino, 2011).
Black Americans continue to have traditional, conservative beliefs when it comes 
to social and moral issues; yet, the connection between conservative messages and Blacks 
continues to remain weak (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). This connection is likely weak 
because of a Republican opposition to policies regarding crime, school funding, and a 
other issues. These Republican views have resulted in the party being viewed as 
insensitive to the needs and circumstances of minority communities (McDaniel &
Ellison, 2008, p. 189). It is likely that the party viewed to work hardest for Black 
interests will receive political support from Black voters (Hajnal & Lee, 2007).
There is a knowledge gap between political ideology and political competition as 
it relates to socioeconomic status for Blacks. Researchers have found a positive 
relationship with political competition and economic growth (Besley et a l, 2010; Ghosh,
2010). In this study, 1 examined what relationships political competition has with SES 
for Blacks as compared to Whites. There is a more detailed discussion in Chapter 2.
Problem Statement 
Political competition offers the potential for solving some structural issues 
associated with the consistent Black-White socioeconomic gaps that continue to be a 
hindrance to Black progress. To address the obstructions to Black progress, 1 examined 
political ideology as it relates to certain determinants, specifically SES benefits. Jacobs 
(1982) pointed out that there are two political determinants related to income inequality, 
first, that political competition should lead to benefits for the have-nots, and second.
6higher political participation and mobilization leads to more influence in political 
decisions. I focused on the aspects of political ideology related to political competition.
Researchers have addressed the voting habits of the general population; but, 
research on Black voting habits is lacking (Kidd et a l, 2007). Hajnal and Lee (2007) 
found that Blacks did not sit on the traditional, political linear scale and “a multi­
dimensional, unordered model more accurately depicts their partisan choices” (p. 36). 
Additionally, Kidd et al. (2007) found that Black religious conservatism could affect vote 
choice; but, identifying with the Democratic Party has a lot of influence for Black voters. 
Kidd et al. also found that the policy positions of Republicans are viewed with suspicion 
by Black voters. This suspicion of Republican policy positions is primarily rooted in the 
interpretation by many Black voters that they are detrimental to Black interests (Kidd et 
al , 2007).
Besley et al., (2010) found a correlation between higher political competition and 
stronger economic growth. Policy changes resulting from political competition have 
been associated with higher per capital growth rates (Besley et a l, 2010, p. 1348). Ghosh 
(2010) confirmed Ibis finding by sludying elecloral competition and economic growlh in 
India.
Purpose of the Study
Slruclural components affecting Black voting ideology and the resulting lack of 
political competition should be addressed. The purpose of Ibis quanlilative study was to 
understand how slruclural components predict political ideology. Further, I addressed
7how differing political competition levels per state predicted components of SES 
Black/White gaps.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
1. Do structural components and discrimination predict Black political ideology? 
Hcjl : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as
causes of the identified gaps, the less likely the respondent will identify as liberal.
Ha I : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as 
causes of the identified gaps, the more likely the respondent will identify as liberal.
2. Does higher political competition predict certain indicators of higher 
socioeconomic status?
Hfj2: The higher political competition is in a state, the less likely household 
income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.
Ha1\ The higher political competition is in a state, the more likely household 
income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.
Nature of the Study 
In this study, I used secondary data collected from the General Social Survey 
(GSS) of 2010 to address the first research question. The National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) collected 2,044 completed cases, a cross-section, from an original sample 
of 4,093 in 2010 by using a full probability sample (Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim,
2011). This sampling design gives an equal probability for each household in the United 
States to be included in the sample (Smith et ah, 2011).
Hunt (2007) indicated that structuralist explanations for inequality from the GSS 
are discrimination (RACDIFl) and chance for education (RACDIF3). These two 
variables were again included in the 2010 GSS and were independent variables for this 
regression. The dependent variable was the traditional liberal-conservative self- 
identification scale (POLVIEWS).
For the second research question, I addressed how political competition per state 
might predict certain socioeconomic Black/White differences. Political competition was 
the independent variable and Black household income and educational attainment were 
the dependent variables. To measure political competition per state, I used the 
percentage of votes cast for the current governor of each state. Pacheco (2008) created a 
measure for political competition based on votes cast in in a single presidential election. 
The measure is operationally defined as Political Competition = 1 0 0 - (absolute value % 
Democratic Vote -  50). High values represent states with a high measure of political 
competition and low values represent no competition (Pacheco, 2008). Like Pacheco, I 
rescaled the measure to range from 0 to 1.
To measure SES, I used data collected from the 2010 American Community 
Survey (ACS) based on two measures for socioeconomic status: income and education. 
These data were collected for two races identified by the ACS: Black or African 
American alone and White alone. For Black household income per state, I broke down 
household income into four brackets. I also broke down the educational attainment 
measurement into four brackets. I did the same for those that identified as White alone 
for each socioeconomic measure. These data were found in already published tables
9through the American Fact Finder on the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. The estimates 
of the population by the ACS measure the sampling error with either 90 % margins of 
error or different confidence intervals (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). The margins of error 
or confidence levels are all based on the amount sampled from the population (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009). There is a more detailed discussion of the analysis and methods 
in Chapter 3.
Theoretical Base
Social contract theory involves three different schools: negative rights, positive 
rights, and the liberal/interest based approach (Hickey, 2011). Hickey noted that one of 
the primary goals for each of these social contract theories is for social protection and 
justice; but, the difference is in their approach. Additionally, the social contract theories 
have all attempted to describe the relationship between a government, communities, and 
citizens (Hickey, 2011).
In this study, I used the Lockean social contract theory which came from the 
Second Treatise o f  Government published in 1689. The Lockean social contract 
approach is considered negative, and relates to the natural rights that each individual has 
(Hickey, 2011). According to Hickey, key policy decisions come from a combination of 
market, community, and public-private partnerships which are meant to contribute to the 
public good.
A central component of Lockean social contract theory is the protection of 
property and the unequal distribution of it (Guest, 1992). The promotion of justice is 
based on the value of labor and the government’s responsibility to protect that labor
10
(Guest, 1992). This is meant to create a competitive market meant to create more 
productivity and essentially, greater living standards for all (Guest, 1992). Thus, for 
Locke, the role of the government is to encourage a competitive market (Guest, 1992).
If Lockean social contract theory is meant to encourage economic growth through 
economic competition, this same approach may be applied to electoral politics. Besley et 
ah, (2010) found that there is a positive relationship between interparty competition and 
statewide economic growth. These findings were later confirmed by Ghosh (2010).
For Locke (1996), the social contract evolved from the state of nature where 
humans are equal at birth and in a state of perfect freedom to one where political 
authority is given to a chosen legislature through consent. Power and authority was 
natural and equal for all individuals in the state of nature (Locke, 1996). The natural state 
of war, which pits one person against another without an intermediary, will be fully 
described in the literature review, created complications as an individual can inflict his or 
her own justice in the defense of personal property; personal property that was created by 
his or her own labor (Locke, 1996). Consent is an aspect of the social contract and the 
power an individual naturally has was given over to a legislature in order to become an 
impartial magistrate for the defense of property (Locke, 1996).
The purpose of the legislature was to preserve the life, liberty, and property of the 
individual (Locke, 1996). Locke provided four distinct components of the social contract 
that has been made with the legislature: to have the same rules for everyone, laws are to 
be designed for the common good, taxes must not be raised without consent, and power 
must not be transferred to another body without the consent of the people.
11
However, this contract can be reprieved or violated when those in charge overstep 
the bounds of their authority, and thus breaks the contract. The authority then becomes a 
tyrant, with behavior akin to a pirate (Crookston, 2009, p. 118). This authority can be 
taken away when the individual in power reduces the people into slavery or uses such 
components of arbitrary power such as force, treasure, or the institutions in society to 
maintain this power (Locke, 1996). In the Lockean social contract, the legislature is 
meant to protect individualism, the individual then gives up their own natural authority 
through consent, separation of power, government impartiality, and the removal of the 
legislature if power is used arbitrarily.
The contract between individual citizens, communities, and their representatives 
is meant to create an environment for individuals and communities to prosper (Guest, 
1992). McGrath (2011) stated that a lack of electoral competition “frees legislators to 
behave in ways that may eschew the interests of their constituents in favor of self- 
interest, thereby decreasing the likelihood that public policy reflects the will of the 
people” (p. 616). Additionally, electoral competition created an environment where 
representatives will be more responsive to those they represent (McGrath, 2011).
Political competition can create an environment of economic growth, similar to economic 
competition (Besley et ah, 2010). The Lockean social contract theory provided political 
competition and a renewed commitment to the relationship of individual citizens, 
communities, and their representatives to provide economic growth in Black 
communities.
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Definition of Terms
Black conservatism: Black beliefs that are focused on accomplishments of the 
individual, capitalism, and high moral standards (Lewis, 2000).
Black religious conservatism: Religious commitment and conservative beliefs on 
faith, abortion, and homosexuality (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008).
Individualism: The concept that all citizens have inalienable rights to life, liberty, 
protection of property, and dissent (Asumah & Perkins, 2000).
Minority business enterprise: A business that is 51% owned by an individual 
defined as a racial minority (Ndofor & Priem, 2011).
Political competition: Political Competition = 1 0 0 - (absolute value [% 
Democratic Vote -  50]). Here, high values represent an equal split between the major 
parties and low values represent weak competition (Pacheco, 2008).
Socioeconomic status (SES): I used two dimensions of SES: household income 
per year and educational attainment (Iceland, Sharpe, & Steinmetz, 2003).
Structural components: Societal components such as jobs, education, housing, 
and income (Hunt, 2007).
Structuralist explanations: When a lack of achievement is attributed to historical 
or institutional causes (Kluegel, 1990).
Assumptions
It is assumed that there is a link between political ideology for Blacks and a lack 
of political competition in areas where the population is considered to be a Black 
majority. It is also assumed that although both research questions include different
13
samples for data collection, the populations are similar and accurately represented the 
overall Black population. Additionally, it is assumed that statewide political competition 
levels for a presidential election represented the overall competition levels in the state.
Limitations
Weaknesses of this study include the predictions of ideology. As noted in the 
literature review, there are multiple predictors of political ideology for Blacks and Black 
voters do not necessarily sit on the traditional ideological scale. Additionally, it is a 
limitation to assume that the only predictors necessary for ideology are explanations of 
inequality as political ideology is much more in-depth. There are many more reasons 
why income and education may vary from state to state such as geography (Holocomb & 
Lacombe, 2004).
Delimitations
In this study, I did not test the relationship of voters and their representatives. I 
focused on the results of the relationship of political competition and SES. Political 
ideology may have resulted in a lack of political competition. States that lacked high 
levels of political competition may have weaker economic viability.
Significance of the Study
Professionally, politicians and public servants may be able to use the ideas 
presented in this paper to begin to find alternative ways in addressing the BlackAVhite 
SES gap. I hope it will help leaders and scholars recognize the importance of interparty 
competition and its economic benefits. That is, I hope to influence policies and practices
14
of electoral redistricting to give each political party equal access to their perspective 
bases in equal distributive measures.
The positive social change that can result from this study comes from the belief 
that individuals and communities can work better together to solve problems if given the 
opportunity. This study can lead to positive social change by helping policy makers look 
further into the importance of competition within the political system. This may help 
create conditions for individuals and communities to prosper.
Summary and Transition 
Although there has been a growth of the Black middle class over the last 40 years, 
Blacks face structural barriers to the accumulation of wealth as compared to Whites. The 
purpose of this quantitative, cross-sectional study was to examine how structural 
components relate to Black political ideology and how political competition related to 
socioeconomic status. Structural components continue to be related to Black-White 
socioeconomic gaps. Secondary data were used to address the research questions. Results 
may influence policies and practices of electoral redistricting.
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature and Chapter 3 is an explanation of the 
methods. Chapter 4 includes the results of the study. Chapter 5 includes my conclusions 
and recommendations for further study.
15
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Voting behavior of the general populace is well understood; however, few 
researchers have addressed Black voting behavior (Kidd et a l, 2007). Researchers have 
suggested that a more accurate depiction of Black voting behavior is a multidimensional 
model rather than the traditional, linear model (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). That is, “race 
remains the central factor in black partisan decision making. How African Americans 
view American society and the degree to which America they think their own well being 
is tied to the fate of the larger black community” (Hajnal & Lee, 2007, p. 35). However, 
not all Black voters support the Democratic Party; rather. Black voters are more likely to 
support the party that works harder for Black interests (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Republican 
policy positions may be viewed skeptically by some Black voters as these policies may 
be deemed harmful to Blacks as a group (Kidd et al. 2007). Furthermore, identifying 
with the Democratic Party is likely rooted in religious conservatism and guidance 
(Mangum, 2008).
In this literature review, I examined multiple structural components that may 
hinder Black progress: these components relate to jobs, education, housing, and income 
(Hunt, 2007). Sociologists have found that social structure is related to income inequality 
(Sorenson, 1996). To address these components, I examined political ideology as it 
related to certain determinants such as social structure. The positive and negative 
relationships of structural components on Black voting ideology need to be addressed.
The purpose of this study was to understand how structural components related to Black
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political ideology and if political competition has a positive relationship with 
socioeconomic status for Blacks.
The following literature was collected using multiple search terms and the 
following databases: Political Science: A Sage Full-Text Collection, EBSCO Host, 
Political Science Complete, EBSCO Host, Academic Search Complete, Business Source 
Complete, Thoreau, SocINDEX with Full Text, and Google Scholar. I used a variety of 
terms such as Black conservatism and Black conservatives, African American 
conservatism dind African American conservatives, racial equity, conservative racism, 
and Republican racism. Ultimately, my literature search lead to researching 
socioeconomic status gaps between the Black and White communities and political 
competition. The time parameter of my literature review was over the past 30 years.
This chapter is divided into five sections: the history of the Black vote; Lockean social 
contract theory; structural components and hindrances of growth; Republicans, Black 
conservatism, and Black religious conservatism; and voting habits, ideology, and 
connections of economic growth as a result of political competition.
History of the Black Vote 
A short description of the history of the Black vote, the changing patterns, and 
antebellum United States is necessary to better understand the current electoral paradigm. 
Since 1964 with Goldwater’s nomination. Republicans have been perceived to have 
ignored the Black and other urban ethnics vote, writing them off as a probable electorate 
(Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). The year 1964 marked the end of the demographic shift 
from a majority Republican support to a majority Democratic support from Black voters
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as the 36 year, Democratic strategy to bring together the urban electorate and the solid 
south, which began in 1928 with the nomination of a Catholic, appeared to come to 
fruition (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). This strategy is popularly known as the New 
Deal coalition (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). In 1964, Republicans largely gave up on 
their battle for racial equality, which began with the formation of the party, and started 
concentrating their efforts on disaffected White southerners (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 
1999). In 1964, the Republican Party’s presidential nomination was for Barry Gold water, 
who called for ignoring urban voters. This marked the beginnings of the Republican 
southern strategy (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999).
The New Deal coalition or realignment began in 1928 as the Democrats 
nominated A1 Smith for president, a Catholic who opposed the Ku Klux Klan (Sauerzopf 
& Swanstrom, 1999). This New Deal coalition, largely credited to Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, organized the solid south with ethnic and urban minorities in the north 
(Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). The solid south is a term used to describe the overall 
southern U.S. region that was solidly Democratic (Hayes & McKee, 2008; Sauerzopf & 
Swanstrom, 1999).
Prior to this realignment, the Republican Party was given almost complete loyalty 
by Black voters (Harrison, 2002). Black voters were often disenfranchised by 
conservative Democrats in the solid south, which, in the first 30 years of the 20th century, 
was still largely comprised of conservative Democrats who had a solid majority and no 
competition in electoral politics (Grynaviski, 2004).
18
Over the last 40 years, the solid south of old has transformed giving the 
Republican Party national strength (Hayes & McKee, 2007). The new south is not just 
Republican; it has intermittent Democratic strongholds made up of mainly urban. Black 
voters, but national Republican strength as well (Knuckey, 2006). As late as 1950, only 
20% of the southern electorate identified as Republican as compared to 2002, where half 
of the voters were Republican (Hayes & McKee, 2007). This migration to the 
Republican Party was largely made up of White voters (Hayes & McKee, 2007). In 
1990, Republicans held only 17% of statewide offices; but, in 2006, they held 53% of 
those offices. The primary reason for this shift can be traced to the Civil Rights Acts of 
the mid 1960s where national nominees took favorable positions, either for or against the 
Civil Rights Acts (Hayes & McKee, 2007). As the national nominees for each of the two 
major parties chose a position of the legislation, voting behavior eventually followed 
(Hayes & McKee, 2007).
The New Deal helped create a coalition of the solid south and urban voters in the 
north (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). Pruitt (2005) noted, “the inadequate and 
overburdened local relief agencies got needed assistance from President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, which alleviated economic distress for some Black Americans 
and sealed the political migration of Blacks into the Democratic Party in the 1930s” (p. 
462). The New Deal also played a role in the migration of Blacks from the Republican 
Party (Pruitt, 2005).
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Lockean Social Contract Theory
According to Locke (1996), power is ultimately derived from parental jurisdiction 
and the private domain; that is, power is derived from individual control. There are 
multiple levels of power from the magistrate over a subject to the lord over slave. By 
describing the multiple levels of power, Locke described the origins of government, 
which is solely in place “only for the public good” (Locke, 1996, p. 312). To describe 
the origins of government, Locke attempted to examine civil society.
According to Locke (1996), the state of nature is a state where men and women 
are equal at birth and in a state of perfect freedom. In this state, men and women do not 
rely on another, power and jurisdiction are reciprocal, and no human has greater power 
than another (Locke, 1996). When Locke referred to power and a state of perfect 
freedom, he was referring only to property owners as he justified slavery later in the text. 
Locke stated, “But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call 
slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the 
absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters” (p. 336). Locke was coming 
from the perspective of property owners who agree to a social contract.
Locke (1996) described a perfect harmony, liberty, or freedom in the state of 
nature; men and women who are created from God do not have the authority to destroy 
themselves, their possessions, or one another. However, an individual does have the 
authority to destroy or harm another if  that individual is attempting to preserve him or 
herself. By doing so, the individual is actually preserving the rest of humankind by 
ridding it of persons who ignore the rules in the law of nature (Locke, 1996, p. 313).
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Here, men and women not only have the authority but the obligation to punish 
transgressors of the natural law so that future violations might be deterred (Locke, 1996).
In the state of nature, Locke (1996) established two essential rights in the law of 
nature: to punish a crime for deterrence and to seek reparations for the harm done. 
Because of these two essential rights, Locke attempted to justify the need for a proper 
judicial system. In the state of nature, each individual has his or her own executive 
power, but stated that a person cannot be a judge in their own case because self-love 
results in being partial to themselves and to their friends (p. 315). Locke questioned the 
current state of governance or the monarchy, arguing that the state of nature might 
actually be better than subjecting individuals to a monarch’s mistakes or passions.
By describing the state of nature, a state of perfect freedom and liberty, Locke 
(1996) established where men and women were prior to society. Each individual was left 
to defend what was his or hers. If an individual made an attempt on another’s life or 
possessions, Locke argued that the individual then puts himself or herself into a state of 
war with another. An individual then has the natural right to defend himself or herself 
against his or her aggressor (Locke, 1996). Locke was pointing out that when one man or 
woman is taken under absolute or arbitrary power of another without consent, then that 
man or woman is violating natural law.
If an individual is taking another’s power, he or she is declaring war on the other 
(Locke, 1996). Locke believed that the person has the right to defend him or herself from 
this aggression. Locke asserted that rebellion against an abusive use of arbitrary power as 
legitimate as this rebellion is authorized from heaven.
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The state of war is one of the reasons men and women place themselves into 
society, either through consent or contract (Locke, 1996). Although slaver was 
discussed, Locke referred to the natural liberty of property owners, that unless consented 
too, a legislature has no authority. This is derived from the state of war where a man or 
woman consents to be ruled to avoid the issues in the state of nature. The state of war 
and slavery cease to exist when an agreement is made to limit an individual’s power in 
exchange for obedience, as long as this agreement endures.
Locke (1996) contended that the Earth was given to human beings “for the 
support and comfort of their being” (p. 319). All that exists on earth was given from God 
to humankind in common. However, if  the Earth was given to humankind in common, 
Locke asserted, that there must be a way to make the best use of its fruits and resources to 
be beneficial. Each person has only the natural right to property in himself or herself. 
Mixing the natural right of property and labor with nature an individual makes what is 
everyone’s property his or hers.
According to Locke (1996), this is where property ownership begins. The right to 
property ownership is derived from the law of nature. Locke argued that cultivating 
property is more beneficial for all of humankind than the uncultivated land. The value of 
what is tilled on that land creates the need for money and this established the value of 
property by the labor that is placed on it (Locke, 1996).
According to Locke (1996), power is derived from the individual; but, a human is 
a creature that needs to be a part of society. Money is what drives an individual from the 
state of war to civil trade in society (Locke, 1996). Locke described multiple types of
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society that fall short of political society such as conjugal society, society between 
parents and children, and society between master and servant. Since these societies differ 
from political society, Locke wanted to define where exactly political society exists. 
Locke contended that, in political societies, the sole purpose is to preserve property and 
punish offenses against natural law. By relinquishing one’s own executive power as 
described in the law of nature to the public, a person is entering into a contract with 
society.
A person gives up some of his or her own natural authority when he or she enters 
into a social contract, and he or she does this for the protection of society (Locke, 1996). 
Naturally, a human is free, equal, and independent; therefore, a person cannot be exposed 
to a political power without his or her consent (Locke, 1996). An individual is then 
obliged to that society, particularly the rule of the majority (Locke, 1996). Locke pointed 
out that in some American empires, society weakened the strength of the ruler by 
separating the powers into different hands. Locke discussed how society continues from 
one generation to the next, by tacit agreement. In taking the property given to the next 
generation and using the products of society, men and women agree to the social contract 
agreed to by their parents.
A person enters into the social contract, putting themselves under the rule of 
government for the preservation of their property (Locke, 1996). It is because of 
prosperity that results from the preservation of property that a person agrees to the social 
contract (Locke, 1996). Herein, they give up some liberty and power that they had in the
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state of nature to society for the good of society, because the good of society helps 
oneself (Locke, 1996).
Since the legislature is established by consent, Locke (1996) pointed out the 
extent of its power. The legislature cannot make laws without consent of the governed as 
the legislature receives its authority from the consent. This power cannot be arbitrary; 
that is, it cannot be unrestrained, subjective, or convenient. In the state of nature, no one 
has arbitrary power over life, liberty, and property of another, but the purpose of the 
legislature is to preserve this power. A component of the social contract deals with 
preservation of power and the legislative power to make preservation happen. Locke 
described the extent of legislative power in that it is meant to preserve society and not 
destroy it by means contrary to their rights of life, liberty, and property.
Locke (1996) stated that in legislative power, there are four distinct components 
of the social contract. The first is to have the same rules for everyone. Second, the laws 
are to be designed solely for the common good. Third, without consent, the legislature 
must not raise taxes on property. Fourth, power must not be transferred from one body to 
another without the consent of the people.
Locke (1996) discussed the dissolution of government, not by a hostile takeover, 
but rather from within. Locke gave multiple reasons as to why a government should be 
dissolved. Dissolution from within comes from a breach of trust or a violation of the 
social contract; that is, when legislators or those given power, take or otherwise destroy 
the property of the citizenry. This reduces those citizens to slaves and causes a de facto 
state of war. Citizens are essentially absolved from obedience (Locke, 1996, p. 378). The
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individual who is given power then violates the social contract by using force and the 
fiscal resources of the office to corrupt legislators to influence votes (p. 378). Locke 
argued that people are to be the judges of the violators of the contract where they may 
engage in a new contract, with new leaders.
Recent Approaches 
Social contract theory has evolved into three different schools: liberal/interest, 
positive rights, and negative rights (Hickey, 2011). The two largest contributors to 
positive rights approach were Rousseau and Rawls (Hickey, 2011). The positive rights 
approach core concerns were empowerment and equity, social justice. The individual 
was an impartial actor, and the state was the primary policy actor (Hickey, 2011). 
Individuals were considered to be primarily motivated out of concern for the other and 
fairness (Hickey, 2011). Rawls would rather ensure equality by overhauling the current 
institutional arrangements. This would include redistribution based on need (Hickey,
2011, pp. 7-8). In many ways, Rousseau and Rawls believed that earlier social contract 
thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke were primarily concerned with maintaining the status 
quo of institutional inequality (Hickey, 2011).
The liberal/interest approach goals when committed to the social contract were for 
the state to protect its citizens; the individual was isolated from others, the promotion of 
economic opportunity, and a free market guided by the invisible hand (Hickey, 2011). 
This approach was developed first by Hobbes and then more recently by Buchanan 
(Hickey, 2011). The mutual growth of the community was best done through individuals 
maximizing their self-interest (Hickey, 2011).
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The negative rights approach to social contract theory originated with Locke and 
is considered negative because they are rights naturally had by each person (Hickey,
2011). This approach promoted the individual rights of citizenship based on mutual 
respect for the other (Hickey, 2011). The primary policy concerns were similar to the 
liberal/interest approach in regards to security and economic opportunity (Hickey, 2011). 
Instead of the key policy actors being just the state or the free market, there was more of 
a combination where the market, community, and public-private partnerships contribute 
to the public good (Hickey, 2011).
Locke’s (1996) version of social contract theory was meant to protect the 
individual against a predatory state; yet in cases where there might be disputes with 
another, the state was supposed to be the impartial judiciary. The protection of the 
individual’s natural rights and liberty increases economic output (Holocomb, 2004). 
Gwartney, Holocombe, and Lawson (1998) noted that the relationship between 
government expenditures and growth of GDP is strong and persistently negative (T| 42). 
Reductions in government spending increased economic output (Gwartney et ah, 1998).
The relationship of government and its citizens is a central aspect of Lockean 
social contract theory (Guest, 1992). To Guest, government withdraws its right to rule 
when it violates natural law. Guest noted that the government makes it possible for 
citizens to realize the value of personal labor through exchange (p. 24). Government is 
meant to create an exchange or economic environment for the human species to flourish 
(Guest, 1992).
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The promotion of justice in Lockean social contract theory was an aspect of the 
role of government (Guest, 1992). Justice was complex in the negative rights version; 
however, it was based on labor, the value of it, and the government’s responsibility to 
protect that labor (Guest, 1992). This idea asserts that inequality of property ownership 
was necessary to preserve all of humankind (Guest, 1992). This inequality created a 
competitive market, which is meant to create more productivity and essentially, greater 
living standards for all (Guest, 1992).
Structural Compoueuts aud Hiudrauces of Growth
Affirmative Action is considered by some a necessary component of life in the 
United States because it attempts to balance out the imbalances perpetuated by slavery 
(Drake, 2003). Drake argued that a majority of the personal wealth in the United States 
was generated from slavery, the Industrial Revolution, or both (p. 59). If the imbalance 
of wealth and equality is a direct result of slavery, then affirmative action has the 
potential to close the achievement, education, and socioeconomic gaps.
Affirmative Action is the transfer or distribution of wealth from one group to a 
preferred entity (Drake, 2003). This program is not just a 4 decade old package suited to 
curb economic inequality between Whites and Blacks, but rather a 4 century old policy 
that dates back to the beginning of the European settling of the Americas (Drake, 2003). 
This was the beginnings of Affirmative Action but not in the same meaning that is often 
associated with the phrase today; one of a redistribution of opportunity or wealth to 
underserved communities (Drake, 2003). Rather, the argument pointed out that the
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transfer of wealth came from indentured servants and later slaves, to the preferred group 
of European settlers (Drake, 2003).
The overall Black condition in society as compared to Whites, has remained 
largely unchanged since mid 1970 (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks argued that this 
has been a direct result in the decline in industry in the United States as many jobs 
secured by Blacks in the United States are blue-collar, manufacturing, and low to 
medium wage. Pager, Wester, and Bonikowski. (2009) suggested that discrimination 
helps explain current and historical disparities between Blacks and Whites.
Pager et al. (2009) ran a field experiment testing contemporary discrimination in a 
low-wage job market. Pager et al. attempted to measure how negative attitudes about 
Blacks are converted into real discrimination in the job market. Pager et al. noted that 
each of the testers, came from a variation of White, Black, and Hispanic racial groups. 
They were artificially given different resumes and histories (Pager et a l, 2009). The 
testers applied for real jobs and were asked to record the responses during the interviews, 
call backs, and/or nonreplies (Pager et ah, 2009). Even with similar backgrounds 
presented on paper and interview training completed by all testers. Blacks were less 
likely to receive a call back or a job offer at only 15.2%, whereas Whites were at 31% 
(Pager et ah, 2009). Pager et al. found that a White job applicant who had a criminal 
record would do equally well, if  not better, than a Black applicant with no criminal record 
(p. 785). While there was no evidence of overt racism or hostility by potential 
employers, by giving the testers similar backgrounds and training for a variety of job 
openings, in many cases race can be explained as the sole criterion for the decision to hire
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or not (Pager et al., 2009). Pager et al. added the uncompromising nature that categorized 
the employer’s decision was a form of exclusion (p. 785). Discrimination was a reality in 
that job market (Pager et ah, 2009).
Hunt (2007) measured perceptions or beliefs of inequality from Black, White, and 
Hispanic respondents over a 27 year period ending in 2004 by using General Social 
Surveys. The findings show many similarities in Black-White perceptions as far as 
direction of inequality (Hunt, 2007). Hunt identified four items that address perceptions 
of inequality. Hunt pointed out that the two structuralist items from the GSS were mainly 
due to discrimination and because most Blacks don’t have the chance for education that it 
takes to rise out of poverty. Insofar as individualist explanations for inequality, 
according to Hunt, the items were because most Blacks have less in-bom ability to learn 
and because most Blacks just do not have the motivation or will power to pull themselves 
out of poverty. As far as White perceptions are concerned, there was a 7 point decline in 
Blacks lacking the ability (5.3%); however, there was a 6 point increase in the belief that 
Blacks lack motivation (26.8%) in that time frame (Hunt, 2007). White perception of 
education (12.6%) and discrimination (20.5%) as the causes of inequality increased 
during that 27 year period examined (Hunt, 2007).
Black explanations of inequality in regards to lack of Black ability increased 
slightly (2.2%) as motivational explanations did as well by 11.3% (Hunt, 2007). 
Educational (5.4%) explanations decreased just a point, and discrimination (35.4%) 
dropped 13 points (Hunt, 2007). Black and White respondents recognized the impact 
discrimination has in determining socioeconomic differences between Blacks and
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Whites; but, Blacks are more likely to believe that discrimination was the cause of the 
differences (Hunt, 2007). The individualist explanations for inequality for Black 
respondents have increased during this time period.
When combining the items ability and motivation into a person-centered category 
or individualism. Hunt (2007) found that Black yes responses increased but fell short of 
Whites. Hunt combined the items education and discrimination into a structuralist 
category. Whites bad a three point increase to 33.1% and Blacks bad a 15 point decline to 
40.8% (Hunt, 2007). Blacks and Whites recognized that certain structural components 
might be reasons for BlackAVhite SES differences (Hunt, 2007). The findings by Hunt 
suggested that beliefs in individualism for Blacks are actually increasing, while beliefs in 
structural inhibitions are decreasing.
The 1940s offered the Black population in the United States a period of wage 
increases compared to Whites; this time period is considered the first Black improvement 
era (Sites & Parks, 2011). This era occurred shortly after the Great Depression as the 
entire nation recovered, suggesting Black SES improvement is positively correlated with 
national economic improvement (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks argued that this 
was a because of the migration of millions of Blacks from the southern agricultural-based 
economy, to northern cities, which were more industry and labor intensive. This was a 
factor that contributed to the lessening of the wage gap between Blacks and Whites (Sites 
& Parks, 2011).
Certain federal, state, and local policies that effected discrimination during this 
time period were also factors (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks noted that the FEPC
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mandated that there be no discriminatory practices within the government and defense 
related industries. The growth of unions, other government policies meant to reduce 
discrimination and the mobilization of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), might have 
helped in decreasing the wage, achievement, and opportunity gaps (Sites & Parks, 2011). 
A government mandated approach; however, dealt only with government institutions and 
defense-related industries (Sites & Parks, 2011).
Sites and Parks (2011) noted that Black wage growth stagnated between the first 
and the second Black improvement era. The second era occurred from 1965 and 1975 
(Sites & Parks, 2011). It was during the second Black improvement era that equality and 
simple, democratic rights such as voting, became the primary focus for Black activists 
and politicians from both parties (Sites & Parks, 2011). Moreover, Sites and Parks added 
that “black-white male earnings ratio stood at .62 in 1964, rose to .72 by 1975, then fell 
to .69 by 1987” (Sites & Parks, 2011, p. 47). In the 23 years following 1964 there was 
fluctuation in the black-white male earnings ratios (Sites & Parks, 2011).
According to Sites and Parks (2011), the second Black improvement era can be 
explained by Civil Rights enforcement along with other landmark Civil Rights legislation 
that were passed during the mid 1960s, which included desegregation of schools. This 
explanation is largely accepted by scholars as the reasons for the decline in the wage gap 
from 1965-1975, however, the Black-White earnings ratio has further separated since 
1975 (Sites & Parks, 2011). The increasing wage gap since 1975 can be associated with 
the deindustrialization that has occurred and the increase in cultural or economic
31
emphasis on skills-based jobs (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks noted that Black 
workers were disadvantaged by this new economic emphasis as a potential explanation 
for the current disparity. However, critics of the skills-based explanation offer an 
alternative view that emphasized that employment losses in industry for Blacks actually 
began as early as the 1950s (Sites & Parks, 2011). These critics have also contended that 
the real value of minimum wage and less unionization in the private market could be 
stronger arguments for the persistent increase in the wage gap (Sites & Parks, 2011).
Sites and Parks argued that the most viable solutions in closing the wage gaps came from 
government and political intervention (Sites & Parks, 2011).
While evidence existed suggesting that the supply and demand explanations for 
the wage gap are legitimate. Blacks still faced a disproportionate wage disparity, even 
though educational gains should be continuous (Sites & Parks, 2011). Gains in education 
should continue from generation to generation and close the wage and achievement gaps 
(Lee, 2002). Proper education is considered an equalizer that results in economic and 
cultural equality (Lee, 2002). Lee added that proper education increases educational or 
learning outcomes for all students and increases the chances of higher education and 
earnings for minority students. However, the Black-White achievement gap in education 
has increased since the late 1980s (Lee, 2002).
From the 1970s to the late 1980s, White educational achievement remained 
relatively stable while Black educational achievement skyrocketed; this pattern has 
reversed itself since the late 80s (Lee, 2002). Overall, the Black-White achievement gap 
associated with education has narrowed; however, there is empirical evidence suggesting
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that there still are gaps among different racial groups (Lee, 2002). Similar patterns were 
observed with college-bound SAT takers (Lee, 2002).
Nowhere is the Black-White achievement gap in education more prevalent than in 
urban centers throughout America (Lewis et ah, 2008). From the critical race theory 
background, there is the insistence that the urban classroom is today’s most prominent 
expression of racism and segregation (Lewis et ah, 2008). Moreover, Lewis et al. noted 
that there is a substantial achievement gap in education nationally, but the urban student’s 
gap is far worse. Of the 11 urban education settings examined by Lewis et ah, not one 
had more than 20% of their Black fourth-grade math students ranked in the At Proficient 
or the At Advanced categories combined. The national average was 30% of students in 
the United States in the proficient category in Grade 4 math (Lewis et ah, 2008). In 
comparison, the national average for White students was 40% in the proficient category 
and just 12% for African American students (Lewis et ah, 2008, p. 133).
Similar results are found when examining 8th grade students in mathematics 
(Lewis et ah, 2008). While it seems that the achievement gap through education has 
fluctuated nationally, the gap is worse in urban school settings (Lewis et ah, 2008). The 
Black-White achievement gap in education as it narrowed is a much researched subject 
and many scholars attempted to attribute something to the successes (Lee, 2002).
One attempted reduction in the achievement gap in education came via social 
capital theory put into practice (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). Lee and Friedrich noted that this 
attempt in reducing the achievement gap was known as SLCs, which were small schools 
inside of big schools, where teachers and students interact consistently together in a
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designated area. SLCs existed with solid theoretical foundations and appear to be 
financially viable as funding comes from government and private resources (Lee & 
Friedrich, 2007). However, according to Lee and Friedrich, large central city schools 
trailed behind other schools who participated in the SLC program.
Lee and Friedrich (2007) examined 193 schools in 30 different states that ranged 
from schools in large cities to small, rural schools and were identified by being already 
underperforming. Lee and Friedrich noted that these schools were very segregated as 
these schools were only 38.7% racially diverse. The majority of ethnic minority students 
were located in large city schools (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). There was student 
improvement seen each year at the large city schools but the improvement was modest 
and students were not affected equally (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). The year-by-year 
improvement had an inverse relationship based on race (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). White 
students had positive correlations while Black students had negative correlations with this 
measure of achievement (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). There was more improvement by 
White students from this type of approach; but. Black students seemed to lag behind 
depending on the location as rural and suburban schools had different results (Lee & 
Friedrich, 2007). Lee and Friedrich argued that this program is an attempt to change the 
outcome for opportunity by changing certain assumed structural limitations.
Payne (2008) attempted to understand the perception of educational opportunity 
by lower-income Black students who have experiences of street life. Payne examined 
two different subsamples. First, Payne examined high school and nonhigh school 
graduates and second, a subsample organized by generation in ages ranging from 16-24,
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25-44, and 45-65. Payne also gathered two focus groups of seven men each to explore 
the standpoint of men coming from or living in street life.
All generations of the men had negative attitudes toward the availability of 
opportunity and education as they believed that generally, they were prohibited from 
accessing opportunity in the United States (Payne, 2008, p. 14). Even though they 
generally felt as if  they were blocked from opportunity through education, 74.1% of the 
men cared about the grades that they are currently or did receive (Payne, 2008). Further, 
71.4% of the men agreed that if  a student tries hard enough, then they can succeed 
(Payne, 2008).
In the first subgroup, the men identified with the traditional belief in the United 
States that if  an individual worked hard then success will happen; however, a majority of 
the men believed that opportunity and the structure of society hampered their chances 
(Payne, 2008). Almost three quarters of respondents disagreed that all people get fair 
treatment and that low-income students have a similar chance at success and a solid 
education as a wealthy student (Payne, 2008).
In the second subgroup, Payne (2008) found that attitudes towards education and 
opportunity differed. Specifically, the young men were more optimistic about success 
than the older men. The older generations had developed more negative attitudes toward 
economic and/or educational opportunity being equal or better than Whites (Payne,
2008).
SES levels can affect educational goals. Strayhorn (2009) stressed that Black 
males who are from families of high SES tend to have higher educational aspirations than
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those from families of lower and low SES (p. 722). Educational aspirations and 
perceptions of opportunity through education are related to SES and SES has the greatest 
influence in measuring college aspirations (Strayhorn, 2009).
Strayhorn (2009) found that the educational goals and ambitions are influenced by 
a student’s neighborhood and urbanicity. Black men from suburban neighborhoods and 
schools have higher aspirations than those in urban schools. The differences were even 
more pronounced between Black males who live in suburbs and rural areas (Strayhorn, 
2009, p. 723). Strayhorn surmised that there might be some group effect at each of the 
different areas examined; that within similar contexts or neighborhoods, values and 
beliefs, may be reinforced.
Some solutions for eliminating the achievement gap in education within urban 
settings recommended by Lewis et al. (2008) dealt directly with each level of individuals 
involved; administrators, families, and communities. The administrators must create an 
environment promoting excellence and academic achievement instead of focusing on 
discipline and other duties that do not include instruction (Lewis et a l, 2008). Lewis et 
al. concluded that administrators must also be responsible for high standards, professional 
development, and ensuring a high quality of teaching that is based on best practices (p. 
146). Lewis et al. recommended new funding for after-school activities, which should 
not be limited to athletic functions, but include functions that are meant to improve 
academic achievement. There must also be more involvement from Parent-Teacher 
Association activities than what currently exists (Lewis et ah, 2008).
36
One solution for increasing SES could be venture capitalism (Rubin, 2010). 
Venture capitalism has become one of the strongest job creating machines promoting 
economic growth in the served areas (Rubin, 2010). Venture capitalism is an equity 
investment into a private company that is in its early stages (Rubin, 2010). These 
investments primarily occur in locations that have a supportive infrastructure and are 
technologically related (Rubin, 2010). Rubin added that 66% of the dollars received 
from 2006 to 2008 were located in just five industries: software, biotechnology, medical 
devices and equipment, industrial/energy, and telecommunications. Because of this 
concentration of venture capital into very few economic areas, certain populations and 
locations are underserved (Rubin, 2010). Besides issues of discrimination, information 
failure and a lack of common networks between the venture capitalists and those 
underserved communities, is relevant in Black communities (Rubin, 2010). However, it 
was found that minority-focused venture capital had higher returns than that of traditional 
investments (Rubin, 2010).
There are three obstacles that need to be overcome in order to enable greater 
capital investment into underserved communities (Rubin, 2010). These obstacles include 
difficult travel time, absence of developed infrastructure, and a lack of education that 
involves the operation of venture capital (Rubin, 2010). Rubin noted that in order to 
overcome these obstacles, venture capitalists must increase operating costs and lower 
their profits (p. 826). Rubin pointed out that incentive for venture capitalists in 
overcoming these obstacles reduces their motivation to invest in underserved 
communities.
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Regardless of the obstacles that take place in venture capitalism, Rubin (2010) 
offered the idea of developmental venture funds where the intent is not only profit but 
also social returns. One example of developmental venture funds from the public-sector 
is the CRA (Rubin, 2010). One purpose of this act is to encourage banks to invest in 
typically underserved regions or communities with subsidies in order to get over the 
venture capitalism obstacles (Rubin, 2010). With that, the idea is to begin with public- 
sector investment, in order to jump start the private venture capital market (Rubin, 2010).
One area that has received attention from scholars and politicians with regard to 
public investment are MBEs (Bates, 2009). Typically, MBEs are smaller and younger 
than other vendors (Bates, 2009). Bates concluded that MBEs are usually more credit- 
constrained and usually a subcontractor for government projects in hopes to jump start 
their businesses (Bates, 2009). However, public agencies that are meant to pave ways for 
equality may be hindrances for stronger minority-owned firms in that these agencies 
attempt to help smaller, younger MBEs first (Bates, 2009). Bates added that stronger 
firms generally foster economic development and create jobs. The public agencies may 
also be hindrances for some start up MBEs, especially agencies that attempt to secure 
procurements for MBEs as they often have slow payments of invoices (Bates, 2009).
In 2002, there were a total of 38,324 MBEs throughout the country that generated 
an income of more than $1 million, and this included Black and Hispanic owned firms 
(Bates, 2009). MBEs also employed just fewer than 1.5 million people which was 
roughly 38 workers per firm (Bates, 2009). Bates noted that the stronger MBEs typically 
located in underserved communities. However, these businesses are penalized for
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success as public agencies often assume that they have overcome discriminatory barriers 
(Bates, 2009). Most MBEs start out with capital of $50,000 or less and are less reliant on 
debt financing, 36.4% of MBEs were started by college graduates, and almost 70% have 
the government as a major client as compared to nonminority businesses at only 50% 
(Bates, 2009). When asked about perceptions of barriers for MBEs, almost 70% wanted 
large contracts to be unbundled, and 45% wanted quicker payments of invoices (Bates,
2009).
When considering that MBEs, especially in construction-related industries, often 
locate operations or headquarters within minority communities, there is the potential to 
help some low-income Black neighborhoods (Bates, 2009). MBEs have the potential to 
help create jobs in poor, minority communities and target low-income Blacks for job 
openings (Bates, 2009).
Blacks are not the only racial group that has received benefits from Affirmative 
Action policies. Harris (2009) noted that Whites can be beneficiaries as well because 
organizations involved in affirmative action benefit from new groups (Harris, 2009). 
However, as much as these organizations might seem to grow, there are still disparities in 
the Black-White SES gaps (Harris, 2009). Harris noted that diversity leads an 
organization to recruit, retain, and promote the most talented workforce; resulting in 
higher productivity for employers (p. 368). If an organization does not have a structure 
that promotes diversity, then it lacks diversity and creativity from its workers (Harris, 
2009). Harris found that discrimination still exists even with the intervention of 
affirmative action policies.
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Another structural component of the Black/White SES gap deals with housing 
(Hunt, 2007). Although it is illegal, people are often separated or segregated as a result 
of where they might live or what they might look like (Osypuk, Galea, McArdle, & 
Acevedo-Garcia, 2009). To quantify residential segregation, Osypuk et al. introduced a 
mechanism they called the interquartile range and overlap statistic (IQR-OS) which is “a 
measure of distributional overlap to characterize the degree of separateness of two 
groups’ distributions on a continuous measure of neighborhood poverty” (p. 32). The 
IQR is the central 50% of distribution of poverty per neighborhood and the overlap 
statistic measured how much this distribution overlaps based on demographics (Osypuk 
et ah, 2009). For Whites, the median neighborhood poverty rate was 5.8% with a range 
of seven points and for Blacks was 17.5% with a range of 20 points (Osypuk et ah, 2009). 
This statistic showed the overall average; but, when examining metropolitan areas, 27% 
of the minority distribution overlaps the White distribution (Osypuk et ah, 2009).
Osypuk et al. indicated that neighborhood poverty distributions are separated between 
minorities and Whites. The neighborhood environment for minorities was worse than for 
Whites. Osypuk et al. argued that the more that segregation increases the higher the 
poverty increases.
Squires, Friedman, and Saidat (2002) conducted a 2001 survey of D.C. residents 
and the surrounding suburbs attempted to understand adult perceptions of their housing 
search; their experiences of discrimination, satisfaction with their neighborhood, and their 
perceptions of racial equality. Overall, Blacks had different experiences and outcomes 
than Whites (Squires et ak, 2002).
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Approximately 60% of Black respondents believed that being near public transit 
is very important; in contrast about a third of White respondents viewed that as a 
necessity (Squires et al., 2002). Squires et al. added that Black respondents rated level of 
crime, neighborhood racial composition, taxes, and public services as being very 
important in the selection of their current neighborhood of residence more often than 
White respondents (p. 162). Of equal importance for Black and White respondents were 
affordability, the quality of schools, and proximity to work (Squires et ak, 2002).
Squires et al. (2002) pointed out that 77% of Blacks prefer to live in a racially 
mixed neighborhood or a majority Black neighborhood as compared to about half of the 
White respondents. As far as their experiences with discrimination. Blacks were three 
times as likely as Whites to report that they had experienced it themselves and two times 
as likely to report that they knew someone who has experienced discrimination (Squires 
et ak, 2002). More than 95% of Blacks who experienced discrimination did nothing 
about it and 50% of that percentage claimed that nothing would come out of filing a 
complaint and the same percentage of Whites felt the same way (Squires et ak, 2002).
Squires et ak (2002) found that almost 60% of White respondents believed that 
opportunity and housing choices of Blacks and Whites are essentially equal; whereas 
16% of Blacks felt a similar way. This is a key difference between Black and White 
perceptions of discrimination. Squires et ak found that Blacks viewed generations of 
slavery and discrimination as factors in creating unequal conditions where it concerns 
upward mobility.
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There have been some programs developed and run in order to create more equal 
conditions for upward mobility (Wilson, 2010). Wilson pointed out that MTO was a 
program meant to help create conditions of upward mobility and was created by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This program was modeled 
after the Gautreaux program, which ended up relocating 7,100 families from inner-cities 
to suburbs, half of those families relocated to White suburbs (Wilson, 2010).
Wilson (2010) argued that critics of the Gautreaux program asserted that it was 
nonrandom and contained elements self-selection bias. Self-selection bias describes the 
effect of people grouping themselves together based on common characteristics (p. 206). 
The program conducted a lottery awarding housing vouchers to families who lived in 
public housing in five major U.S. cities: Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and 
New York (Wilson, 2010). This program was more experimental than the Gautreaux 
program as winners were randomly assigned to one of three groups: two groups received 
vouchers of which, one group was allowed to use the voucher anywhere in the market 
and the other must find rentals in low-poverty areas, and the third group received no 
assistance (Wilson, 2010). The results were significant but offered weak conclusions: 
first, there were improvements in health, physically and mentally and second, the 
employment and educational gaps did not close (Wilson, 2010). Sampson (2010) argued 
that a majority of MTO families moved from a highly segregated neighborhood to 
another highly segregated neighborhood.
Programs like affirmative action have had some positive effect; but, that effect 
has not necessarily benefitted the intended recipients. As of 2009, White households
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averaged $51,861 while Black households averaged only $32,584 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2010). Overall, discrimination and chance for education appear to be the 
largest structural impediments to Black upward mobility.
Republicans, Black Conservatism, and Black Religious Conservatism 
Republican efforts to mobilize Black voters in conjunction with social and moral 
issues have failed (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). McDaniel and Ellison noted that the 
Republican Party is often perceived as the party for Whites while the Democratic Party is 
often considered the more inclusive party. White religious conservatives have moved to 
the Republican Party; however. Blacks of a similar religiously conservative background 
have not because they have different religious interpretations (McDaniel & Ellison,
2008). This is largely because “the combined effects of historical, community, and 
familial ties to the Democratic Party may serve as an anchor, slowing any drift toward the 
GOP” (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008, p. 189). According to McDaniel and Ellison, Blacks 
are, as a majority. Biblical literalists, and Black preachers continue to interpret culture in 
relation to biblical interpretation (p. 180). McDaniel and Ellison added that the real 
belief in socially conservative values of many Blacks is offset by certain Democratic 
policies.
Lewis (2000) found that there has been an overall ideological shift of African 
Americans identifying themselves as liberal to conservative. However, there has not 
been the same consistency in a shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. 
Instead, there was a decline in Republican identification for Blacks to as low as 4% in 
1996 (Lewis, 2000). Whereas for Whites, as conservatism goes up, so does registration
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of or preferences for the Republican Party (Lewis, 2000). Lewis pointed out that this is 
because there is a distinct difference in the definitions of conservatism between Blacks 
and Whites. Specifically, Blacks often associate conservatism with religion focusing on 
social and moral concerns than with politics (Lewis, 2000). Lewis noted that Whites 
focus more on issues involving the proper government role and economy.
Race has an impact on public impressions of candidates and whom voters choose 
to represent them in office (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). Matsubayashi and Ueda 
pointed out that in most cases, the regular voting public does not know what a candidate 
stands for, relying on simpler ways of getting information on who they might vote for. 
This means that most voters do not cast their vote on solid details of the candidate’s 
political stances. For this group of voters, the vote is largely decided based on 
incumbency, race, and party (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). Matsubayashi and Ueda 
pointed out that if  the precinct or district is majority White and is considered to be in high 
SES, the candidate will be less likely to win if they are Black and Democrat. However, 
race has little effect on low socioeconomic areas that are majority White (Matsubayashi 
& Ueda, 2011).
According to Matsubayashi and Ueda (2011), there were three reasons why race 
plays such a significant impact on majority White and upper socioeconomic areas. First, 
White voters assumed Black, Democratic candidates are more concerned about racial 
equality than other issues. Second, voters dreaded any competition for control of 
economic resources (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). The third reason is that Black public 
officials are labeled with lower qualifications or a lack of competence by these voters
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(Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). The vote for Democrats decreases by as much as 25% in 
precincts where the candidate is Black and Democratic (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011).
The role of Black conservatives in political life has not significantly affected 
Black political identity (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). A distinguished Black conservative who 
used to be one of two Black Republicans elected to Congress since the New Deal and the 
end of WWII was Watts (Snipe, 2000). Snipe pointed out that Watts declined to be 
involved with the Congressional Black Caucus as he insisted that he did not have to 
belong to group identity.
Mangum (2008) wanted to know if Black Partisanship was affected by religious 
guidance and church attendance (p. 916). Whites who have strong religious beliefs have 
a strong association with the Republican Party (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). Mangum 
asserted that Blacks remain committed to both the Democratic Party and its candidates (p. 
918). Mangum argued that the majority of Blacks have stronger religious commitment 
and their religious beliefs are more traditional than most other races.
Mangum (2008) found that religious guidance keeps Blacks devoted to the 
Democratic Party, but the church does not. Religious guidance and attendance to church 
are poor predictors. Magnum did not find a relationship between Black, Democratic 
partisanship and race identification or Black common fate (p. 927). The doctrine 
espoused by Black churches is more favorable to the Democratic Party, a doctrine that 
has roots in liberalism and social justice; it is the message being delivered within 
churches that keeps Blacks entrenched within the Democratic Party (Mangum, 2008).
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Hall (2008) argued that today’s political institutions are an extension of slavery, 
an extension that continues to dominate Black communities. Hall concluded that there 
are issues with conservatism, Black conservatism, and Black America. Hall argued that 
there is a hidden racism that exists within the Republican Party and that Black 
conservatism and components of the ideology can be traced back to those slaves who 
worked in the master’s house. Hall argued that words like special interest and diversity, 
when coming from conservatives, are code words meant to continue the history of 
oppression of Black citizens of the United States.
Hall (2008) claimed that most scholars are oblivious or have chosen to ignore the 
racism. Hall pointed out most members of Black communities still today consider they 
themselves field slaves and relate Black conservatives with house slaves. Hall argued 
that historically, “domination encouraged them to embrace the master’s political 
perspective as their own” (p. 567). Hall reasoned that individuals who branch out and 
call themselves Black conservatives are mentally subjugated by White conservatives as 
conservatism is actually meant to keep the status quo. Because of this mental 
subjugation. Black conservatives embrace, in order to garner better status within the 
conservative world, their master’s political stances.
Asumah and Perkins (2000) pointed out that Black Conservatives’ ideas in 
solving the multiple issues of the multiple Black communities are similar to today’s 
White conservative platform; but, they are insufficient. Asumah and Perkins argued that 
these ideas involve limited government, materialism, and individualism but are 
underdeveloped do not lead to the resolution of problems of the Black community”(p.
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52). Asumah and Perkins reasoned that the biggest issue with conservative ideas in 
solving these problems comes from the structure of today’s political society and the 
assumption that opportunity is equal.
The conservative political platform concerns corporations or big business and 
contains a racist syllogism. Asumah and Perkins (2000) argued that this syllogism relies 
on the assumption that the Black community does not need government assistance 
because the American polity is now on a level playing field. Asumah and Perkins 
asserted that another necessary assumption is that the state of the Black community is the 
result of nihilism and a lack of moral rectitude (p. 58).
Voting Habits, Ideology, and Connections of Economic Growth as a Resnit of
Political Competition 
Black voters, as a majority, are considered being highly partisan with the majority 
voting for officials on the Democratic ticket (Kidd et ak, 2007). However, Black voters 
are far from identical (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). For instance, Hajnal and Lee pointed out 
that when examining Black partisan choice, the structure of party choice is more complex 
than is suggested by a simple, linear continuum (p. 11). Hajnal and Lee noted that unlike 
Blacks, most United States citizens fit onto the traditional linear scale, with Democrats on 
the left. Independents in the middle, and Republicans on the right.
Hajnal and Lee (2007) pointed out that because of the Civil Rights legislation of 
the late 1950s and 1960s, which occurred while Democrats had leadership roles in the 
legislative and executive branches, 40% of Blacks identified themselves as liberal, half as 
moderates, and 10% identified themselves as conservatives in the early 1970s. The
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majority identified themselves as Democrats. However, there has been a steady shift 
from the Democratic Party where today only two-thirds of Blacks identify as Democrats 
(Hajnal & Lee, 2007).
According to Hajnal and Lee (2007) the majority of Blacks who leave the 
Democratic Party, or never register with the party in the first place, become 
Independents. Of the 40% of Blacks who no longer identify as Democrat, 2% identify as 
Republican and the rest identify as Independent (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee 
argued that the main reason for the link between liberal and conservative party affiliation 
are fiscal and social issues, rather than moral or religious issues (p. 17). Hajnal and Lee 
confirmed that specific liberal approaches to issues had an effect on Black partisanship 
while socially conservative approaches to issues did not.
The reason Blacks maintain Democratic and Independent, as a majority, for party 
identification was because they principally agreed that government should have an 
interactive, more liberal role (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee asserted that 
unemployed Blacks were 16% more likely to identify as Republicans and is contrary to 
the upward mobility thesis. Upward mobility thesis assumes that the higher the 
socioeconomic status is for an individual the more likely they would identify as 
Republicans (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Black home owners were also more likely to identify 
as Democrats (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). These findings were consistent when measuring 
perceptions of Blacks who either live in the suburbs or in urban areas (Hajnal & Lee, 
2007).
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Sigelman and Willnat (2000) tested attitudinal differentiation between Blacks 
who either lived in the urban areas of D.C. or lived in suburban areas of Prince George’s 
county Maryland. Sigelman and Willnat first tested assimilation theory, which asserts 
that Black suburban homeowners will assimilate to White culture, but found little support 
in their analysis for this theory. Sigelman and Willnat then tested transplantation theory, 
which suggested that suburbia families even before becoming middle class were 
distinctly middle class all along, as they moved to suburbia they just brought their middle 
class attitudes with them. However, Sigelman and Willnat found no support for this 
theory. The final theory tested by Sigelman and Willnat was that of identity persistence 
emphasized an attitudinal unity rather than bifurcation among Blacks (p. 679). There 
were some differences of attitudes between suburbanites and urbanites, but this theory 
seemed to have the strongest results of the three theories (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000).
The respondents in Prince George’s county were generally more educated, more 
affluent, and younger than their urban counterparts (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000).
However, both groups agreed that the persistence of inequality fell on the shoulders of 
White racism (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). Sigelman and Willnat found that D.C. 
residents were more likely to believe that if  Blacks would be just as thriving as Whites if 
they tried harder. Sigelman and Willnat found that D.C. residents were more open to the 
idea the Black progress was being decelerated by White resistance (Sigelman & Willnat, 
2000). As far as policy differences, D.C. residents believed more in economic 
redistribution, racial preferences during hiring, and community development in African 
American communities (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). Both groups of residents were
49
slightly left of center in a traditional political ideology scale and heavily pro Democratic, 
even though, there were SES differences between the two groups, identity persistence 
theory prevailed (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000).
Hajnal and Lee (2007) pointed out that partisan choice for Blacks, regardless of 
SES and ideology, is most likely rooted in the perception of how hard a party might work 
towards solving Black issues. Hajnal and Lee found that Blacks who think that the 
Democratic Party is working to resolve such issues are 34% more likely to self-identify 
as Democrats, whereas if respondents thought that the Republican Party worked harder 
toward resolving these issues, they were 28% less likely to identify as Democrats (p. 19). 
Blacks will likely support candidates or a party who are perceived as working hard for 
Black interests.
Spence and McClerking (2010) examined participation rates of Black voters when 
the mayor of a city was Black along with the length of time served by the mayor. The 
results revealed a dichotomy with regard to participation (Spence & McClerking, 2010). 
In every situation Spence and McClerking examined they found that as the Black 
population increases in a given city. Black political participation increases as well when 
donations and activism are considered (Spence & McClerking, 2010). However, the 
longer an incumbent is in office, the more participation rates decreased (Spence & 
McClerking, 2010). Spence and McClearking surmised that “citizens living in strong 
empowerment contexts were 9 percentage points less likely to participate in voter 
registration drives than citizens not living in strong empowerment contexts” (p. 919). 
Spence and McClerking also found that SES had an effect on participation in regards to
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donation and activism in that the higher an individual’s SES, the more likely that person 
would be to participate.
Leighley and Matsubayashi (2009) found that Whites are more likely than Blacks 
to discuss politics within their circle of friends, largely because of education and income. 
Leighley and Matsubayashi pointed out that people of racial and ethnic minorities who 
have a higher SES have richer and more diverse networks. Networks, population 
increase, and high SES all play significant roles in determining Black political 
participation (Leighley & Matsubayashi, 2009; Spence & McClerking, 2010).
There was an old racism in the United States that equated certain races superior to 
other races (Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011). Carmines et al. pointed out that 
there is now a new racism in the United States. Carmines et al. argued that this new 
racism is an alliance of racial animosity and traditional American values, such as 
individualism. Carmines et al. reasoned that Whites are no longer overtly racist, but they 
have special resentment for Blacks because they believe they lack specific, traditional 
values such as hard work, sacrifice, and discipline. Carmines et al. pointed out that 
racism is intertwined in the language of American values, specifically individualism.
Taylor and Merino (2011) examined racial attitudes, religion, and stratification 
ideology with an emphasis on individualism. Taylor and Merino found that historically. 
Black respondents had more of a structuralist ideology regardless of what religious 
background the respondent might have had. Differences between Blacks and Whites in 
individualism beliefs were coming closer as Whites were 5 percentage points more likely 
to associate a lack of Black motivation for racial inequality (Taylor & Merino, 2011).
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However, Taylor and Merino found that when considering issues such as a chance for 
education or discrimination, Whites were 30% less likely to agree on those issues with 
Blacks.
Black voters are generally conservative when it comes to social and moral issues 
related specifically to their community (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). Taylor and Merino 
(2011) found that over 60% of Blacks were Protestant, a form of Christianity that 
emphasizes beliefs that focus on these social and moral issues. Whites, of similar 
religious backgrounds as Blacks, had a more significant showing of beliefs in 
individualism (Taylor & Merino, 2011). However, according to Taylor and Merino, this 
difference in this statistic between Whites and Blacks was edging closer.
Soliman and Cable (2011) found that there is more likely to be corruption if 
political competition is weak. Soliman and Cable argued that political corruption is 
inversely related to economic growth. Corruption is widely regarded as having an 
inverse relationship with economic growth (Drury, Krieckhaus, & Lusztig, 2006). Kim 
(2009) pointed out that political competition is necessary to reduce political corruption in 
that “political competition opens up the government, reduces secrecy, and thus, reduces 
corruption” (p. 85). Kim noted that if  there is a reduction in political corruption by an 
increase in political competition, then there should be an increase economic growth.
Besley et al. (2010) found that political competition increased economic growth. 
However, political competition as it relates to economic growth is a subject that has 
received little attention (Besley et ak, 2010). Besley et al. developed a theoretical model 
that illustrated how a positive effect of political competition may result from encouraging
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political parties to promote growth rather than focus on special-interest policies 
implement growth-promoting policies rather than special-interest policies” (p. 1330).
This model is based on swing voters and a critical threshold of competition that when 
met, will create more progrowth economic policies (Besley et ah, 2010). Besley et al. 
found that there was a positive relationship between high political competition and high 
economic growth results.
Ghosh (2010) confirmed the findings of Besley et al. (2010) by examining 
political competition in India. Ghosh argued that there is a significant positive 
association between political competition, measured in terms of percentage of votes and 
per capita income (p. 1040). In areas where competition is higher, the more likely that 
economic growth is stronger than in areas with weak political competition (Ghosh, 2010).
Summary
Although there has been a growth of the Black middle class over the last 40 years. 
Blacks face structural barriers to the accumulation of wealth as compared to Whites. The 
purpose of this quantitative, cross-sectional study was to examine how structural 
components relate to Black political ideology and how political competition related to 
socioeconomic status. Structural components continue to be related to Black-White 
socioeconomic gaps. Secondary data were used to address the research questions. Results 
may influence policies and practices of electoral redistricting. Chapter 3 is an explanation 
of the methods used to gather and interpret the data.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this cross-sectional, quantitative study was to examine the effects 
of perceptions of structural conditions on Black political ideology and to add to the 
multidimensional model originally created by Hajnal and Lee (2007). I assessed the 
relationship of statewide political competition on Black household income and education. 
Besley et al. (2010) and Ghosh (2010) suggested that there is a positive correlation 
between statewide economic growth and political competition. I examined whether this 
correlation existed, specifically for factors of household SES, for a continually 
underserved population in the United States.
There are interrelated aspects of the sociocultural and economic structure faced by 
Black Americans. The perceptions of inequality and its relation to Black political 
ideology needed to be addressed. One area of the literature that has yet to be examined is 
the relationship of political competition with Black household income and Black 
educational level. In this chapter, I explain the reasons for conducting a cross-sectional 
design over others design types, the population and sample, where the data came from, 
and the instrument used.
Research Design and Approach
The sampling design was a cross-section and is a common design in many of the 
social science fields (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias, causality in the traditional sense is difficult to establish in this 
design and is considered a limitation to this design. The limitation of the design concerns 
its internal validity. This is overcome through the use of “statistical analysis to
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approximate some of the operations that are naturally built into an experimental design” 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 117). To avoid this issue, I ran multiple and 
multivariate regressions to approximate results.
A cross-sectional design was chosen over experimental or quasi-experimental 
design as I did not intend to measure causality. Rather, I attempted to find relationships 
between perceptions of inequality and political ideology. Additionally, I attempted to 
find what correlations existed between state political competition. Black household 
income, and Black educational level compared to Whites.
Setting and Sample 
The GSS has been run by the NORC since 1972 and has a vast richness of data.
In order to get a snapshot of the perceptions of inequality and the relationship with 
political ideology, I used secondary data collected by the GSS in 2010. NORC collected 
2,044 complete cases out of an original 4,093 randomly selected cases using a full 
probability sample (Smith et ak, 2011). Full probability sampling design gives each 
household in the United States an equal probability of being included in the sample 
(Smith et ak, 2011). The data were collected using computer assisted Personal 
Interviewing (CAPl) and in 2010, there was a response rate of 0.703 (Smith et ak, 2011).
In order to get a snapshot of the relationships between political competition.
Black household income, and Black educational level, 1 collected data based on the 
political competition measure created by Pacheco (2008). The data were collected from 
each of the states in the U.S. official election boards. This was based on the votes cast in 
the 2008 presidential elections.
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To assess the Black household income and educational level per state, I used data 
collected by the American Community Survey (ACS). The data were collected using a 
sampling frame of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Master Address File (MAP), which is the 
official inventory of housing units (Hus) and group quarters (GQs), the two different 
samples collected by the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Data for HUs were 
randomly selected and collected in two different phases: Phase 1 was also referred to as 
main and supplemental sampling where interviewers attempted to interview potential 
participants either by phone or mail questionnaire of approximately 3 million U.S. 
samples; the second phase was conducted on samples that had not completed the first 
option through the use of CAPI (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
GQs are considered “college residence halls, residential treatment centers, skilled 
nursing facilities, group homes, military barracks, correctional facilities, workers’ 
dormitories, and facilities for people experiencing homelessness” (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2009, p. 4-10). GQs consist of roughly 200,000 individuals annually (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2009). Two different strata are identified, small facilities, where data are 
collected similarly to HUs and large facilities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Small 
facilities are separated into five subframes, “small versus closed on Census Day, new 
versus previously existing, GQ type (such as skilled nursing facility, military barracks, or 
dormitory), and geographical order (county, tract, block, street name, and GQ identifier) 
in the small GQ frame” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 4-11).
Large facilities are sorted by type and geographical order where a sample of 
groups of 10 for each facility is selected (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). For example, if  a
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large facility had a population of 600, then there were 60 groups of 10. Then, a random 
sample of the groups was selected based on the predetermined sampling rate, which 
depends on the size of the state and number of facilities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
Data Analysis
For the first research question, I ran a multiple regression with two independent 
variables (RACDIFl; RACDIF3) and a single dependent variable (POLVIEWS). Black 
political ideology is complicated, fluid, and potentially related to structural issues in U.S. 
society (Hajnal & Lee, 2007; Hunt, 2007). Explanations for the economic disparity 
between Blacks and Whites may be related to discrimination (RACDIFl) and an equal 
chance for education (RACDIF3) by Blacks (Hunt, 2007). What is not known is how they 
might relate to political ideology.
For the second research question, I determined what correlation existed between 
politically competitive states. Black household income, and Black educational level for 
most of the U.S. States. This correlation was examined by running a multivariate 
regression where political competition was the predictor variable. The four different 
brackets of household income and educational level were the outcome variables.
Instrumentation and Materials
For the first research question, I used variables from the GSS. These variables 
can be accessed from the NORC Public Use Data Catalog. The dependent variable was 
the traditional seven-point political ideology scale and the GSS labeled it as POL VIEWS: 
one is extremely liberal and seven is extremely conservative. The independent variables 
were labeled RACDIFl and RACDIF3 on the GSS and are concerned with explanations
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for differences in jobs, income, and housing between Whites and Blacks. RACDIFl asks 
if the differences are due to discrimination and RACDIF3 asks if the differences are due 
to a chance at education to rise out of poverty. The responses to these variables are 
categorical, yes or no.
For the second research question, I collected the percentage of votes cast for the 
Democratic presidential candidate in 2008. This measure is operationally defined as 
Political Competition = 100 -  (absolute value [% Democratic Vote -  50]). High values 
represent higher political competition in a state whereas lower values represent lower 
political competition in a certain state. Pacheco (2008) rescaled the measure from 0 to 1 
to ease statistical interpretation and I did the same. The data for elections came from 
each of the states’ official election boards.
For Black household income and educational level, I used data collected by the 
2010 ACS. Household income per year brackets were as follows: (a) $0-$24,999, (b) 
$25,000-49,999, (c) $50,000-$74,999, and (d) $75,000-above. Educational brackets are 
as follows: (a) no high school diploma, (b) high school diploma, (c) some college, and (d) 
college degree. These variables can all be found using the American FactFinder. The 
different estimates of the population all contained one of two measures for sampling 
error: either a 90 % margin of error or confidence intervals (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). 
This measure was based on the amount sampled from the population (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2009).
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Protection of Human Participants
The data used in this study were all secondary data coming from various sources: 
the GSS, the U.S. Census’ American Community Survey of 2010, and the various states 
official election boards. Each of these sources employed protective measures of their 
participants and did not release any personal information of participants. All of the 
respondents for the GSS were 18 years or older (Smith et ah, 2011). For the U.S.
Census’ American Community Survey, all information for identification was removed 
and certain methods were introduced to make sure that respondents remained confidential 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
Summary
Chapter 3 is a description of the research method that was conducted. For the first 
research question, a simple multiple regression was run with explanations for inequality 
variables as the predictor variables and political ideology as outcome variables. There is a 
description of the results of this model in Chapter 4.
For the second research question, a multivariate regression with political 
competition as the predictor variables and differences in socioeconomic status for Blacks 
and Whites as the outcome variables was run. There is a detailed explanation of the 
results in Chapter 4.
59
Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction
Black political ideology was more complicated than the traditional, political 
ideology self-identification scale for most United States citizens (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). 
Additionally, some Blacks may believe that reasons for the Black-White SES gap are 
related to structural issues faced by Blacks in the United States (Hunt, 2007; Taylor & 
Marino, 2011).
There is a positive relationship of high political competition and high economic 
growth (Besley et ak, 2010; Gosh, 2010). Essentially, higher political competition might 
persuade policy makers to adopt policies that promote growth rather than special interest 
ones (Besley et ak, 2010). The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand how 
structural components predict political ideology and how differing political competition 
levels per state predict components of SES for Blacks. In this chapter, I describe and 
interpret the results of this study.
Data Analysis
Data analysis began after receiving approval from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) with approval number 08-08-12-0182323. Data for the first research question were 
taken from the 2010 GSS and were focused specifically on Black respondents. Data for 
the second research question were taken from the 2008 election results of each of the 
state’s official election boards in order to measure political competition. The data for 
educational attainment and household income for Blacks and Whites came from the 2010 
American Communities Survey conducted yearly by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Descriptive Statistics
For the first research question, there were a total of 311 Black respondents in the 
2010 GSS. To begin, I calculated the frequencies and percentages of responses to the 
survey for the three variables: think of self as liberal or conservative (POLVIEWS), 
BlackAVhite socioeconomic differences are due to discrimination (RACDIFl), and 
BlackAVhite socioeconomic differences are due to lack of education (RACDIF3). 
Response rates varied for each of these variables: POLVIEWS had 293 respondents, 
RACDIFl had 219 respondents, and RACDIF3 had 224 respondents answer the question.
For the political self-identification measure or POLVIEWS, there were seven 
different possible responses, and ranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. 
The results were as follows: extremely liberal (7.2%), liberal (16.0%), slightly liberal 
(11.6%), moderate (38.2%), slightly conservative (10.2%), conservative (11.6%), and 
extremely conservative (5.1%). See Table 1 for more information.
Table 1
Political Self-Identification Measure
Frequency Percent
Extremely Liberal 21 7.2
Liberal 47 16.0
Slightly Liberal 34 11.6
Moderate 112 38.2
Slightly Conservative 30 10.2
Conservative 34 11.6
Extremely Conservative 15 5.1
Total 293 99.9
Both of the variables, RACDIFl and RACDIF3, had categorical, yes and no 
responses. For RACDIFl, 62.1% of respondents believed that the BlackAVhite
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socioeconomic differences were related to discrimination while 37.9% believed that it did 
not (see Table 2). For RACDIF3, 54% of respondents believed that the Black/White 
socioeconomic differences are related to a lack of opportunity for education (see Table 
3). The majority of respondents still believed that the Black/White socioeconomic gaps 
were related to structural issues.
Table 2
Are Black/White Socioeconomic Gaps Mainly Due to Discrimination
Frequency Percent
Yes 136 62.1
No 83 37.9
Total 219 100
Table 3
Are Black/White Socioeconomic Gaps Because M ost Blacks Not Having the Chance fo r  
Education That it Takes to Rise Out o f  Poverty
Frequency Percent
Yes 121 54
No 103 46
Total 224 100
For the second research question, political competition values ranged from the 
highest level in Indiana (.9995) and the lowest level in Hawaii (.7820). See Table 4 for 
more information. The mean for all 50 states was .9190 with a standard deviation of 
.0489.
62
Table 4
Political Competition Levels per State
State Political
Competition Level
State Political
Competition Level
Indiana 0.9995 Michigan 0.9257
North Carolina 0 9970 Washington 0 9235
Missouri 0 9929 Maine 0 9229
Florida 0 9897 Tennessee 0.9183
Ohio 0 9850 Kansas (T9I65
Virginia 0 9737 Nebraska 0 9160
Montana 0.9727 Kentucky 0.9117
Georgia 0 9699 Louisiana 0 8993
Colorado 0 9634 Connecticut 0 8941
Iowa 0 9612 California 0 8899
Minnesota 0 9594 Arkansas 0 8886
New Hampshire 0 9562 Alabama 0 8874
Pennsylvania 0 9535 Massachusetts 0 8820
Arizona (T95I2 Illinois 0 8808
South Carolina 0 9490 Delaware 0 8806
Nevada 0 9485 Alaska 0 8789
South Dakota 0 9475 Maryland &8777
North Dakota 0 9462 New York 0 8708
Wisconsin 0 9378 Rhode Island 0 8687
Texas 0 9368 Idaho 0 8610
Oregon 0 9325 Utah 0.8441
New Mexico 0 9309 Oklahoma 0 8435
Mississippi 0 9300 Vermont 0 8254
New Jersey 0.9273 Wyoming 0.8237
West Virginia 0 9260 Hawaii 0 7820
The SES indicators were educational attainment of the population over the age of 
25 and household income per year. The percentage of the Black population within each 
bracket of each state were calculated and then subtracted against the percentage of the 
White population within each bracket of each state. There were variances for each of the 
states, which is why it is important to figure the socioeconomic differences for Blacks 
and Whites, in each of the states. For educational attainment, the data for the Black
63
population in the following states were unavailable: Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Similarly for household income per year, the 
data for the Black population were unavailable in the following states: Idaho, Maine, 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. These 
states were not included in the analysis.
Nationally, the mean for the percentage of the Black population in each 
educational attainment bracket were (a) no high school diploma (17.45%), (b) high 
school diploma (31.65%), (c) some college or associates (33.26%), and (d) college degree 
(17.63%). See Table 5 for more information.
Table 5
Mean Percentage o f  the National Population o f  Blacks within each Educational 
Attainment Bracket, age 25 or over
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With no High 17.45 3 66 13 38
School Diploma
% With High 3165 427 18 20
School Diploma
% With Some 33 26 4.70 22.14
College or
Associates
% With a College 17 63 3 36 11.30
Degree or Higher
The mean percentage of the national Black population for household income per 
year in each bracket was (a) $0-24,999 (38.98%), (b) $25,000-49,999 (26.91%), (c) 
$50,000-74,999 (15.65%), and (d) $75,000 and above (18.47%). See Table 6 for more 
information.
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Table 6
Mean Percentage o f  the National Population o f  Blacks within each Plousehold Income 
per Year Bracket
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With Income 38 98 8 60 73 96
Between $0-24,999
% With Income 26 91 2T3 4.55
Between $25,000-
49,999
% With Income 15 65 277 7 66
Between $50,000-
74,999
% With Income 18.47 7.53 56J7
Above $75,000
In order to properly calculate the differences in Black/White socioeconomic gaps, 
White brackets for the same socioeconomic indicators were also created. The same states 
included in the analysis for the Black population were used for the White population. 
Insofar as the percentage of the national White population within the educational 
attainment bracket, Whites appear, on average to have higher educational attainment 
levels than Blacks: (a) no high school diploma (11.61%), (b) high school diploma 
(29.58%), (c) some college or associates (29.69%), and (d) college degree (29.26%). See 
Table 7 for more information.
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Table 7
Mean Percentage o f  the National Population o f Whites within each Educational 
Attainment Bracket, age 25 and over
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With no High 11.61 107 9.44
School Diploma
% With High 29 58 426 18 18
School Diploma
% With Some 29 69 173 13.90
College or
Associates
% With a College 29 26 5.31 2117
Degree or Higher
As for the percentage of the national White population within each household 
income bracket per year, Whites again, on average appeared to have higher incomes than 
Blacks: (a) $0-24,999 (22.06%), (b) $25,000-49,999 (24.35%), (c) $50,000-74,999 
(19.01%), and (d) $75,000 and above (34.57%). See Table 8 for more information.
Table 8
Mean Percentage o f  the National Population o f Whites within each Plousehold Income 
per Year Bracket
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With Income 22 06 4.40 19 39
Between $0-24,999
% With Income 2A35 121 10.29
Between $25,000-
49,999
% With Income 19.01 1.21 1.46
Between $50,000-
74,999
% With Income 34.57 7.77 60 30
Above $75,000
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To get the difference in the Black/White socioeconomic gap, I subtracted the 
difference of the population percentage between educational attainment and household 
income per year between Blacks and Whites. If more of the Black population falls within 
a certain bracket the integer is positive, while if  Whites fell within a certain bracket, the 
integer is negative. In most states, the percentages of the White population in each 
bracket had more of their population than Blacks. Insofar as the national educational 
attainment brackets, on average the majority of the Black population had a smaller 
percentage of their population achieving high educational levels: (a) no high school 
diploma (5.84%), (b) high school diploma (2.07%), (c) some college or associates 
(3.57%), and (d) college degree or higher (-11.63%). More Blacks have no high school 
diploma, just a high school diploma, or have not finished college than Whites. However, 
a majority of Whites, on average, have finished college (see Table 9).
Table 9
Percent Difference o f the Population Between Blacks and Whites within each 
Educational Attainment Bracket, age 25 and over
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With no High 5.84 4.26 18.155
School Diploma
% With High 2.07 4.76 22.66
School Diploma
% With Some 3.57 3.80 14.42
College or
Associates
% With a College -11.63 4.37 19.13
Degree or Higher
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
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As for the national differences of household income per year between Blacks and 
Whites, Whites appeared to have more of their population in the upper two income 
brackets, while Blacks have more of their population within the lower two income 
brackets: (a) $0-24,999 (19.48%), (b) $25,000-49,999 (2.55%), (c) $50,000-74,999 (- 
3.37%), and (d) $75,000 and above (-15.39%). See Table 10 for more information.
Table 10
Percent Difference o f the Population Between Blacks and Whites within each Plousehold 
Income per Year Bracket
Bracket Mean Std. Deviation Variance
% With Income 19.48 6.87 47.20
Between $0-24,999
% With Income 2.55 2.70 7.30
Between $25,000-
49,999
% With Income -3.37 3.28 10.78
Between $50,000-
74,999
% With Income -15.39 5.59 31.22
Above $75,000
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The SES differences varied between states as indicated by the variances for each 
of the descriptive variables. The state with the highest number of Blacks as compared to 
Whites in educational attainment for no high school diploma was Minnesota (12%). The 
state with the largest amount of Whites as compared to Blacks in this same bracket was 
Nevada (-4.5%). See Table 11 for more information.
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Table 11
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment
Bracket (a): no High School Diploma, age 25 and over
State Difference State Difference
Minnesota 12.0 Missouri 6.6
Mississippi 11.4 Alabama 6.3
Wisconsin 10.7 Connecticut 6.0
South Carolina 10.6 Ohio 6.0
Louisiana 10.2 New Jersey 5.5
Nebraska 10.0 Alaska 5.3
Colorado 9.7 Georgia 4.1
Florida 9.5 Indiana 4.0
Iowa 9.0 Kansas 3.9
Arizona 8.9 Washington 3.3
New York 8.6 Tennessee 3.2
Massachusetts 8.2 Maryland 3.0
Virginia 7.7 Oklahoma 2.6
Delaware 7.4 Kentucky 0.6
Michigan 7.4 California -2.8
Illinois 7.3 Arkansas -2.9
Oregon 7.3 Texas -4.0
Pennsylvania 7.3 Nevada -4.5
North Carolina 6.8
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The state with the highest number of Blacks as compared to Whites in educational 
attainment for high school diploma was Colorado (12.8%). The state with the highest 
number of Whites as compared to Blacks in this same bracket was Arkansas (-10.4%).
See Table 12 for more information.
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Table 12
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment
Bracket (b): High School Diploma, age 25 and over
State Difference State Difference
Colorado 12.8 Georgia 1.8
Arizona 12.6 Washington 1.6
California 9.4 Wisconsin 1.3
Connecticut 8.3 Louisiana 1.1
South Carolina 7.8 Kansas 1.1
Nevada 6.6 Minnesota 0.7
Maryland 5.7 Mississippi 0.4
Virginia 5.3 Tennessee 0.2
Texas 4.8 Missouri -0.2
Alaska 3.6 Michigan -.09
New Jersey 3.5 Illinois -.09
Alabama 3.3 Indiana -1.7
New York 3.2 Ohio -1.8
North Carolina 3.2 Kentucky - 1.8
Massachusetts 3.1 Nebraska -3.2
Florida 2.3 Iowa -4.6
Delaware 2.3 Oregon -7.8
Oklahoma 2 Arkansas -10.4
Pennsylvania 1.9
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The percentage of the Black population per state who had some college or an 
associate’s degree was on average higher than for Whites. For the majority of states, 
Blacks either did not finish college or Blacks have an associate’s degree at a greater 
percentage than Whites. The state with the largest percentage of Blacks compared to 
Whites who fell in this bracket was Arkansas (12.3%). The state with the largest 
percentage of Whites compared to Blacks who fell in this bracket was Arizona (-6.4%). 
See Table 13 for more information.
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Table 13
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment
Bracket (c): some College or Associate’s degree, age 25 and over
State Difference State Difference
Arkansas 12.3 New York 4
Kentucky 7.8 Michigan 4
Nebraska 7.6 Missouri 3.9
Illinois 7.5 Pennsylvania 3.6
Ohio 7.3 Virginia 3.5
Texas 6.8 Alaska 2.5
New Jersey 6.8 North Carolina 2.1
Massachusetts 6.7 Oklahoma 1.9
Washington 6.7 Wisconsin 1.7
Indiana 6.5 Minnesota 1.3
Kansas 6.1 Louisiana 0.2
Maryland 5.7 Alabama -0.2
Georgia 5.1 Florida -0.4
Oregon 5 Colorado -1
Connecticut 4.8 Mississippi -2.3
California 4.7 Delaware -3.3
Iowa 4.7 South Carolina -3.6
Tennessee 4.5 Arizona -6.4
Nevada 4
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
For the final bracket, there are differences between Blacks and Whites in 
percentages of the populations that have a college degree or higher. The state where 
more Blacks than Whites, as a percentage of the identified population, have a bachelor’s 
degree was Arkansas (1%). The state with the largest difference between Whites and 
Blacks was Colorado (-21.5%). See Table 14 for more information.
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Table 14
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment
Bracket (d): College Degree or TTigher, age 25 and over
State Difference State Difference
Arkansas 1 Florida -11.5
Oregon -4.5 Louisiana -11.6
Nevada -6 North Carolina -12.1
Delaware -6.4 Pennsylvania -13
Oklahoma -6.5 Wisconsin -13.7
Kentucky -6.6 Indiana -13.8
Texas -7.4 Minnesota -13.9
Tennessee -7.9 Illinois -14
Iowa -9.2 Maryland -14.4
Alabama -9.4 Nebraska -14.5
Mississippi -9.5 South Carolina -14.8
Michigan -10.4 Arizona -15.1
Missouri -10.4 New Jersey -15.7
Georgia -11 New York -15.9
Kansas - 11.1 Virginia -16.5
Ohio -11.3 Massachusetts -18.1
Alaska -11.3 Connecticut -19.3
Washington -11.4 Colorado -21.5
California -11.5
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The other socioeconomic indicator, household income per year, showed a similar 
pattern of population percentage differences between Blacks and Whites as the 
educational attainment variable with a higher percentage of Blacks in the lower brackets. 
For the first bracket, household income per year between $0 and $24,999, there was one 
state, Hawaii (-7.99%), where the White percentage of the population outnumbered the 
Black percentage. As for the rest of the states. West Virginia (33.24%) had the largest 
difference and Alaska (6.72%) had the lowest (see Table 15).
72
Table 15
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per
Year Bracket (a): $0-24,999
State Difference State Difference
West Virginia 33.24 Alabama 20.21
Iowa 29.99 New York 19.85
Tennessee 27.74 Washington 19.45
Minnesota 27.54 Texas 19.32
Oklahoma 26.57 Connecticut 18.96
Oregon 24.89 Utah 18.07
Nebraska 24.52 Indiana 17.73
South Carolina 24.47 Colorado 17.42
Ohio 24.33 Virginia 17.39
North Carolina 23.97 Georgia 16.9
Mississippi 23.47 Missouri 16.9
New Mexico 23.36 Delaware 16.44
Pennsylvania 22.74 New Jersey 14.72
Rhode Island 22.28 Florida 14.68
Louisiana 22.21 Massachusetts 14.6
Wisconsin 21.98 Kentucky 14.57
Kansas 21.67 California 13.98
Illinois 21.19 Arizona 12.73
Michigan 20.49 Maryland 8.03
Nevada 20.49 Alaska 6.72
Arkansas 20.24 Hawaii -7.99
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
In the bracket of household income between $25,000 and $49,000, there was 
some change in the differences, as six states had more Whites than Blacks in the bracket 
as a percentage of the population: Michigan, West Virginia, New Mexico, Kansas, 
Arkansas, and Oregon. The differences in the percentage of the population also became 
smaller with the largest in Rhode Island (10.36%) and the smallest Ohio (0.06%). See 
Table 16 for more information.
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Table 16
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per
Year Bracket (b): $25,000-49,999.
State Difference State Difference
Rhode Island 10.36 South Carolina 2.05
Virginia 8.04 Louisiana 2.05
Maryland 6.46 Missouri 2.03
Massachusetts 6.27 Nebraska 1.94
New Jersey 5.99 Minnesota 1.93
Hawaii 5.85 Wisconsin 1.68
Connecticut 5.71 Pennsylvania 1.57
Texas 4.87 Tennessee 1.51
Nevada 4.58 Utah 1.23
Delaware 4.24 Alabama 1.20
California 4.13 Iowa 0.75
New York 3.86 Arizona 0.74
Florida 3.49 Mississippi 0.69
Georgia 3.22 Oklahoma 0.56
North Carolina 3.21 Ohio 0.06
Indiana 3.01 Michigan -0.45
Colorado 2.84 West Virginia -0.69
Kentucky 2.75 New Mexico -1.22
Washington 2.54 Kansas -1.32
Alaska 2.17 Arkansas -1.58
Illinois 2.07 Oregon -3.23
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The gap of household income per year between Blacks and Whites was large for 
those making between $50,000 and $74,999. Here, very few states had as a percentage of 
the population, more Blacks than Whites in this income bracket: Hawaii, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and California. The rest of the states all had more Whites than Blacks, by 
percentage of the population, within this bracket. Iowa (-10.63%) has the largest 
difference with Arizona (-0.52%). See Table 17 for more information.
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Table 17
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per
Year Bracket (c): $50,000-74,999.
State Difference State Difference
Hawaii 7.88 New Mexico -3.42
Maryland 2.05 Missouri -3.52
New Jersey 1.36 Pennsylvania -3.77
California 0.15 Utah -3.86
Arizona -0.52 Delaware -3.99
Massachusetts -0.56 North Carolina -4.30
Virginia -0.66 Louisiana -4.79
Alaska -0.72 Michigan -4.79
New York -0.92 Oregon -4.85
Washington -1.12 Nevada -5.16
West Virginia -1.39 Alabama -5.19
Connecticut -1.59 Kentucky -5.48
Colorado -1.63 South Carolina -5.82
Texas -2.08 Ohio -6.23
Georgia -2.41 Arkansas -6.40
Illinois -2.74 Indiana -6.55
Tennessee -2.86 Mississippi -6.61
Kansas -2.98 Minnesota -7.66
Florida -3.21 Nebraska -8.47
Rhode Island -3.27 Wisconsin -9.39
Oklahoma -3.35 Iowa -10.63
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
The household income per state BlackAVhite gap was separated by an even 
further margin in the final bracket, $75,000 and above. The state with more Blacks than 
Whites within this bracket was Connecticut (6.90%). Rhode Island had the largest 
difference with 26.84% more of the White population than the Black population within 
this bracket. Hawaii (-5.75%) had the lowest difference (see Table 18).
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Table 18
The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per
Year Bracket (d): $75,000 and above.
State Difference State Difference
Connecticut 6.90 Maryland -16.54
Hawaii -5.75 Delaware -16.69
New Mexico -7.17 Pennsylvania -16.88
Alaska -8.16 New York -17.27
Oregon -8.70 Kansas -17.38
West Virginia -8.83 Mississippi -17.56
Utah -10.68 Georgia -17.69
Kentucky -11.84 Nebraska -17.99
Tennessee -12.00 South Carolina -18.08
Arkansas -12.27 California -18.27
Arizona -12.94 Wisconsin -18.28
Oklahoma -13.35 Colorado -18.64
Indiana -14.19 Louisiana -19.47
Nevada -14.86 Texas -19.51
Florida -14.96 Virginia -19.93
Michigan -15.25 Iowa -20.11
Missouri -15.41 Massachusetts -20.33
Washington -16.09 Illinois -20.51
North Carolina -16.13 Minnesota -21.81
Alabama -16.22 New Jersey -22.35
Ohio -16.30 Rhode Island -26.84
Note. Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and 
negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.
Findings for Research Qnestion 1 
For the first research question, I focused on a possible relationship between 
structural components faced by Black Americans in gaining similar socioeconomic status 
as Whites with self-identified political ideology. Below is the hypothesis
Hfjl : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as 
causes of the identified gaps, the less likely the respondent will identify as liberal.
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Ha I '. The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as 
causes of the identified gaps, the more likely the respondent will identify as liberal.
To test this hypothesis, I ran a forced entry multiple linear regression with the 
model: POL VIEWS, = 60+ ^iRACDJFl, + 62RACDIF3, + 8,. POL VIEWS was 
transformed from the original 1-7 point scale to account for the differing political 
ideologies one might ascribe too. Extremely liberal, liberal, and slightly liberal were 
coded as 0. Moderate was coded as 0.5 and slightly conservative, conservative, and 
extremely conservative were coded as 1.
I found that discrimination and an equal chance at education beliefs for inequality 
were not good predictors of political ideology. The two predictors accounted for just 
1.7% of variance F (2, 203) = 1.77, p > 05. Additionally, 1 found that discrimination as 
reasons for socioeconomic inequality had a nonsignificant prediction of political ideology 
(P = .089, p > .05), as did belief that a lack of opportunity for education (P = .029, p > 
.05). See Table 19 for more information.
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Table 19
Are Structural Beliefs o f  Socioeconomic Inequality Predictors o f  Black Political Ideology
Variables B SE 5 P
Constant .328 .099
Differences Due to 
Discrimination
.089 .058 .114
Differences Due to 
Lack of Education
.029 .057 .037
Note: No results are statistically significant
Findings for Research Qnestion 2
For the second research question, I focused on the relationships of political 
competition in states and the SES for Blacks in those states. Below is the hypothesis:
Hrj2: The higher political competition is in a state, the less likely household 
income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.
HaI'. The higher political competition is in a state, the more likely household 
income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.
Prior to including the socioeconomic differences of Blacks and Whites, 
correlations and multivariate regressions were run. For Blacks, there was one significant 
correlation between educational attainment and political competition and that was with 
those with a college degree or higher (r = -.404). The other three variables were all 
nonsignificant. For the lower two brackets, there was a positive correlation between 
educational attainment and political competition: no High School diploma (r = .234) and 
High School diploma (r = .163). For the third educational attainment bracket, some 
College or Associates degree, there was a negative correlation (r = -.040). See Table 20 
for more information.
78
There was a positive and significant correlation of political competition and the 
lower two income brackets for Blacks. That is, there is a positive correlation between 
political competition and a household income between $0 and $24,999 (r = .451) and a 
household income between $25,000 and $49,000 (r = .404). There was a negative and 
significant correlation between political competition and a household income between 
$50,000 and $74,999 (r = -.466) and a household income of $75,000 and above (r = - 
.458). See Table 20 for more information.
Table 20
Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition fo r  
Blacks
Variable N Pearson Corr. Sig.
Political Competition 42 1
No High School 37 .234 .163
Diploma
High School Diploma 37 .163 .336
Some College or 37 -.040 .816
Associates
College Degree or 37 -.404 .013
Higher
Income Between $0- 42 .451 .003
24,999
Income Between 42 .404 .008
$25,000-49,999
Income Between 42 -.466 .002
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and 42 -.458 .002
Above
Insofar as the correlation between political competition and educational 
attainment for Whites, there were three significant correlations and one nonsignificant.
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Both of the higher educational brackets were significant and positive, some college or an 
associate’s degree (r = .403) and a college degree or higher (r = .310). As for no high 
school diploma, there was a positive and significant correlation with political competition 
(r = .320). The non-significant correlation of political competition with educational 
attainment was with high school diploma, however, it was positive (r = .294). See Table 
21 for more information.
The correlation between political competition and household income for Whites 
had two significant results. First, the correlation between those making between $25,000 
and $49,999 a year and political competition was significant and positive (r = .416). 
Second, the correlation between those making $75,000 and above and political 
competition was significant and negative (r = -.337). As for the other two brackets, the 
results were nonsignificant but positive nonetheless: $0-24,999 (r = .243) and $50,000- 
74,999 (r = .169). See Table 21 for more information.
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Table 21
Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition fo r  
Whites
Variable N Pearson Corr. Sig.
Political Competition 42 1
No High School 37 .320 .039
Diploma
High School Diploma 37 .294 .062
Some College or 37 .403 .008
Associates
College Degree or 37 .310 .046
Higher
Income Between $0- 42 .243 .121
24,999
Income Between 42 .416 .006
$25,000-49,999
Income Between 42 .169 .285
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and 42 -.337 .029
Above
When examining the percent differences between Blacks and Whites for 
correlations, none of the educational attainment brackets have significance with political 
competition. However, the higher educational brackets have a negative correlation: some 
college or associates (r = -.125) and college degree or higher (r = -.150). The lower 
brackets, however, have a positive correlation: no high school diploma (r = .206) and 
high school diploma (r = .005). See Table 22 for more information.
The household income per year had two significant and three negative 
correlations. The first significant result was in the bracket of those making between $0 
and $24,999, had a positive correlation (r = .398). The second significant result was in
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the bracket of those making between $50,000 and $74,999, had a negative correlation (r 
= -.455). The second and fourth bracket had nonsignificant correlations: between $25,000 
and $49,999 (r = -.175) and $75,000 and above (r = -.226). See Table 22 for more 
information.
Table 22
Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition fo r  the 
Socioeconomic Difference o f  Blacks and Whites
Variable N Pearson Corr. Sig.
Political Competition 42 1
No High School 37 .206 .220
Diploma
High School Diploma 37 .005 .976
Some College or 37 -.125 .460
Associates
College Degree or 37 -.150 .377
Higher
Income Between $0- 42 .398 .009
24,999
Income Between 42 -.175 .268
$25,000-49,999
Income Between 42 -.455 .002
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and 42 -.226 .150
Above
A multivariate regression was run for Black and White racial groups, along with 
the socioeconomic differences of them. For Blacks, political competition significantly 
predicted the fourth educational attainment bracket of those with a college degree or 
higher. Specifically, the results were significant and accounted for 16.3% of the 
variance, F  (2, 37) = 6.84,/) < .05. That is, political competition significantly predicted
82
the percentage of Blacks with a College degree or Higher {fi = -33.36, t = -2.62, p <  .05). 
See Table 23 for more information.
Table 23
Multivariate Regression on Educational Attainment fo r  Blacks over 25: Political 
Competition
Dependent Variables B___________________ SE .6______________P__________________
No High School 21.04 14.75 .234
Diploma
High School Diploma 17.04 13.70 .163
Some College or -4.57 19.50 -.040
Associates
College Degree or -33.36 12.75 -.404*
Higher_________________________________________________________________________
Note: *p <  .05
Insofar as political competition predicting household income per year for Blacks,
1 found a significant prediction for all four brackets. The bracket that explained the 
largest amount of variance was bracket (c) or income between $50,000 and $74,999 as it 
explained 21.7% of the variance, F  (2, 42) = 11.10, p < .05. Political competition 
significantly predicted the percentage of Blacks within bracket (c), {b = -27.56, f  = -.466, 
t=  -3.33,p< .05). See Table 24 for more information.
Table 24
Multivariate Regression on Household Income per Year fo r  Blacks: Political Competition
Dependent Variables B SE 5 P
Income Between $0- 82.84 25.93 .451*
24,999
Income Between 18.44 6.60 .404*
$25,000-49,999
Income Between -27.56 8.27 -.466*
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and -73.70 22.63 -.458*
Above
Note: *p <  .05
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In explaining White educational attainment, I found that political competition is 
not a good predictor. All four variables were nonsignificant (see Table 25).
Table 25
Multivariate Regression on Educational Attainment fo r  Whites over 25: Political 
Competition
Dependent Variables B SE 5 P
No High School -.53 12.74 -.007
Diploma
High School Diploma 16.43 17.46 .157
Some College or 7.12 15.41 .078
Associates
College Degree or -17.31 20.27 -.133
Higher
Note: No results are statistically significant
Insofar as political competition predicting household income per year for Whites,
I found that brackets (b) and (d) were statistically significant. Political competition 
predicted that for Whites making between $25,000 and $49,999, 17.3% of the variance 
was explained F  (2, 42) = 8.38, p < .05. I also found that political competition 
significantly predicted the percentage of Whites within bracket (b), {b = 28.54, = .416,
p  < .05). For bracket (d). White households making $75,000 or above each year, 11.34% 
of the variance was explained. Additionally, 1 found that political competition 
significantly predicted the percentage of Whites within bracket (d), {b = -55.79, f  = -.337, 
p  < .05 [see Table 26]).
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Table 26
Multivariate Regression on Household Income per Year fo r  Whites: Political 
Competition
Dependent Variables B SE B P
Income Between $0- 22.86 14.43 .243
24,999
Income Between 28.54 9.85 .416*
$25,000-49,999
Income Between 4.36 4.02 .169
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and -55.79 24.67 -.337*
Above
Note: *p <  .05
A multivariate regression was run to see what the relationship was of political 
competition with differences in the brackets for the socioeconomic measures, educational 
attainment over the age of 25 and household income per year. Insofar as political 
competition predicting educational attainment, political competition was not a good 
predictor. That is, political competition does not significantly predict whether or not, 
educational attainment for the differences between the populations (see Table 27).
Table 27
Multivariate Regression on Black/White Educational Attainment over 25 Differences: 
Political Competition
Dependent Variables B SE 5 P
No High School 21.58 17.29 .206
Diploma
High School Diploma .60 19.74 .005
Some College or - 11.68 15.62 -.125
Associates
College Degree or -16.05 17.94 -.150
Higher
Note: No results are statistically significant
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When measuring the household income per year difference, I found significant 
results for bracket (a) and bracket (c). The percentage difference between Blacks and 
Whites who had incomes between $0 and $24,999, 15.9% of the variance was explained, 
F  (2, 42) = 7.54,^ < .05. Political competition significantly predicted the differences 
between Black and White incomes for bracket (a), {b = 58.47, p = .398,/) < .05). 
Additionally, I found that political competition significantly predicted the differences in 
bracket (c), $50,000-74,999, and 20.7% of the variance was explained, F  (2, 42) = -31.92, 
p <  .05. The differences between Black and White incomes for bracket (c) were {b = - 
31.92, P = -.455, p  < .05). See Table 28 for more information.
Table 28
Multivariate Regression on Black/White Flousehold Income per Year Differences: 
Political Competition
Dependent Variables B SE B B
Income Between $0- 58.47 21.29 .398*
24,999
Income Between - 10.10 8.99 -.175
$25,000-49,999
Income Between -31.92 9.88 -.455*
$50,000-74,999
Income $75,000 and -27.01 18.39 -.226
Above
Note: * p < .05
Summ ary
The findings of this study were presented in Chapter 4. First, 1 attempted to see if 
there was a relationship with Black beliefs of inequality with Black political ideology. 
Second, 1 attempted to see if  there was a positive relationship with political competition 
and four brackets of each socioeconomic measure: educational attainment over 25 and 
household income per year.
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I found that there was no significant relationship of Black political ideology with 
Black beliefs of inequality. Additionally, of the four brackets for educational attainment 
differences, there were no significant relationships with political competition found. As 
for differences in household income per year, I found two significant relationships with 
political competition. Chapter 5 is a discussion, conclusions for the findings, 
implications for positive social change, and recommendations for additional studies of 
ideology and political competition.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
In this study, I examined the relationship of Black political ideology with 
structural issues faced by Black Americans. Additionally, I examined the relationship of 
statewide political competition with certain structural components of the United States. 
This chapter is a discussion, some conclusions, and recommendations from the inferences 
derived from Chapter 4.
Researchers have provided a new approach to political theory. This approach is a 
less discussed proposition to solving economic problems (Besley et ah, 2010). The 
theoretical foundation for this study was the Lockean social contract theory, specifically, 
the aspects that include economic competition as it might relate to political competition.
In most economic models, economic competition, not monopolies, is valued and 
cherished (Besley et ah, 2010). Rather, I applied the aspects of a competitive economic 
market to a competitive political environment. When a competitive political environment 
is created, there should be more bureaucratic or government productivity, and less 
political corruption that should create greater living standards for all.
Conclusions
In response to Research Question 1, a majority of Blacks believed that they were 
politically moderate (112) with more considering themselves liberal (102) over 
conservative (79). 1 confirmed that Blacks are, as a majority, center-left on the traditional 
political ideology scale; but, this ideology cannot be explained by structural beliefs of 
inequality. A majority of Blacks believed that the structural issues identified.
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discrimination (62.1%) and educational opportunity (54%), were still reasons for 
socioeconomic inequality. The relationship of yes responses to these two structural 
issues did not have a significant relationship with political ideology. I confirmed that 
Black political ideology is still complicated and more multidimensional than previously 
thought. The null hypothesis of explanations for inequality predicting political ideology 
for Blacks failed to be rejected
Although Black political ideology is not predicted by beliefs of structural 
inequality, there is still something that can be gleaned from this. Party loyalty was not 
examined in this paper; but, previous researchers have indicated that Blacks are, as a 
majority, loyal to the Democratic Party (Hajnal & Lee, 2007; Kidd et ah, 2007). Perhaps 
beliefs of structural inequality are better predictors of party loyalty than ideology.
In response to Research Question 2, there are socioeconomic differences between 
Blacks and Whites. Nationally, 29.26% of Whites have a college degree or higher and 
34.57% have an annual household income above $75,000. On the other hand, nationally, 
17.63% of Blacks have a college degree or higher and 18.47% have incomes above 
$75,000. More Blacks (33.26%) over the age of 25 either did not finish college or have 
an associate’s degree as compared to Whites (29.69%). It seems that Blacks do not have 
the necessary resources due to the structural differences shown in the literature as 
compared to Whites. However, 1 did not examine this particular aspect of U.S. society. 
Although it cannot be shown from this research, 1 believe it would be an important study.
The differences in the educational attainment variables included predictable 
outcomes. As percentages of each population, more Blacks have high school diplomas
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(2.07%). Perhaps this is because of the college degree or higher variable as many Blacks 
either choose to or cannot, due to structural issues mentioned in this study, attain higher 
education. The college degree or higher variable indicated that many more Whites per 
state fall within this bracket than Blacks (-11.63%).
As far as household income per year, the trend from lower incomes to higher fell 
within expected differences. That is, on average per state, 19.48% more of the Black 
population than Whites fell in the lowest income bracket. As for the highest income 
bracket, 15.39% more of the White population fell here. The household incomes per year 
from $25,000 and $74,999 differences were closer.
Political competition per state had a negative, but significant correlation with the 
percentage of Blacks per state with a college degree or higher (r = -.404). As political 
competition levels rise in U.S. states. Blacks are less likely to have college degrees or 
higher.
Insofar as household income per year for Blacks, there were positive and 
significant correlations for the lower income brackets. The higher political competition 
is, the more likely Blacks will remain in the lower two brackets. As political competition 
rises, the correlation became negative and significant for Blacks within the higher two 
brackets.
Political competition had a correlation with Whites getting some college or an 
associate’s degree (r = .403) and a college degree or higher (r = .310). Political 
competition had an impact on the educational attainment for Whites. Political
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competition also had a positive correlation with the percentage of the White population 
who did not have a high school diploma (r = .320).
Political competition had a positive relationship with the percentage of Whites 
whose households made between $25,000 and $49,999 a year. However, political 
competition had a negative relationship with White households making over $75,000 a 
year. This indicated that states with higher political competition maintain a White middle 
class.
The differences for Blacks and Whites for educational attainment had no 
significant relationship with political competition. The differences of Blacks and Whites 
for household income per year had two significant relationships. That is, the higher that 
political competition rises, the higher percentage of Blacks that have household incomes 
$24,999 and below rises. The second significant correlation for household income 
differences was with those that made between $50,000 and $74,999 per year. Here, the 
more political competition rises, the more that the White population in a state had 
household incomes in this bracket. Higher political competition levels indicate that the 
population of the White middle class is stronger.
A multivariate regression was then run for the Black and White populations and 
their socioeconomic differences. For Blacks, the four educational attainment brackets 
were regressed on political competition and the only significant result was for the bracket 
of college degree or higher holders. The rate of change of the conditional mean of Blacks 
with a college degree or higher with respect to political competition is estimated to be 
between -59.25 to -7.47. For each increase in political competition, the percentage of
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Blacks in the highest educational bracket decreased by 33.36% was significant at the 95% 
level and explains just 16% of the variance in the model. Political competition had a 
negative relationship with educational attainment with just Blacks for the highest 
educational bracket.
Each of the household income per year brackets for Blacks were significantly 
predicted, at the 95% level, by political competition. Almost 80% of the variance was 
likely explained by the model. The percentage of the Black population in the lower 
income brackets was positive, while the percentage in the upper brackets was negative. 
These results indicated that the higher political competition is the lower the Black 
household incomes. I expect that if  political competition is high, then Blacks are more 
likely to have lower income levels.
I found that political competition is not a good predictor of educational attainment 
for Whites; however, it did significantly predict two of the four household income 
brackets. Specifically, as political competition levels rise, the percentage of White 
household incomes with incomes between $25,000 and $49,999 also rise. As for the 
percentage of households with incomes $75,000 and above as political competition rises, 
the percentage of White households within this bracket significantly fell.
I also found that political competition, when the differences in educational 
attainment are found, was a poor predictor with no significant results. When I examined 
the differences in household income with political competition, however, there were two 
significant results at the 95% level. Contrary to the alternative hypothesis presented in 
this study, it appeared that political competition did relate positively to the lowest bracket
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of Black household incomes. There was a significant and positive prediction of 
differences for the lowest income bracket. The higher political competition rises, the 
more likely Blacks will have the lowest amount of their population in household income. 
Political competition had a positive relationship with Whites and incomes between 
$50,000 and $74,999. The null hypothesis of political competition relating positively to 
Blacks in the higher brackets for each socioeconomic measure failed to be rejected.
Although political competition does not have a positive relationship with 
differences in BlackAVhite SES, there is still much to be learned from this study. Hajnal 
and Lee (2007) found that unemployed Blacks are more likely to identify with the 
Republican Party, and is contrary to the upward mobility thesis. That is, unemployed 
Blacks are 16% more likely to identify as Republican rather than Democratic (Hajnal & 
Lee, 2007). SES was not a good predictor of certain voting patterns for Blacks. Political 
competition had a negative relationship with household income differences between 
Blacks and Whites. The higher the political competition per state, the more likely that 
Blacks will be in the lowest household income per year bracket. This does not indicate 
that Blacks in this bracket will be unemployed, rather, it indicate that the higher political 
competition, the more likely that lower income Blacks contribute to that competition 
model.
Implications for Social Change
I attempted to see if political competition related positively to certain 
socioeconomic measures. Political competition increases per capita income per state 
(Besly et ah, 2010; Ghosh, 2010), but there was a gap in the literature as to how this
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affected certain racial groups identified by the U.S. Census. Contrary to previous studies, 
I could make no conclusion that this relationship existed. Rather, it appeared that 
political competition might create an atmosphere of negative socioeconomic growth for 
Blacks. The implications for social change appeared to be a reduction in political 
competition might have stronger results for the household income per year for Black 
households. It is likely that because Blacks continue to have socioeconomic inferiority 
than Whites, on average. Blacks will thrive more in states that have lower political 
competition levels.
It will be important to examine future political competition models and their 
relationships with socioeconomic measures for different races of U.S. citizens. It 
appeared that unlike economic competition, where rising tides should lift all boats, 
political competition results in the maintenance in socioeconomic divides between Blacks 
and Whites.
Recommendations for Further Study
The multidimensional model for Black political ideology needs further evaluation. 
Not only do beliefs of structural reasons for BlackAVhite inequality not predict political 
ideology, but they do not correlate. I found that Blacks are more divided on the 
ideological spectrum than previously thought, but maintain a center-left structure. One 
recommendation for this model is to see how Black allegiance to the Democratic Party 
and Black center-left political ideology are related to historical variables such as the Civil 
Rights movement, Jim Crow laws, and Affirmative Action.
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Insofar as political competition and socioeconomic status, the results were 
contrary to previous studies (Besley et al., 2010; Ghosh, 2010). However, it should be 
noted the models used were different where other studies focused on per capita income. 
The relationship to a government protecting natural rights and socioeconomic status 
needs further examination. States with higher levels of political competition may be 
restricting the natural rights of Blacks within those states. Whites may be taking 
advantage of a system that favors political competition. A politically-competitive state 
could be predisposed to favoring the racial majority in the state.
These are important questions that need answers. They are important because one 
of the greatest travesty’s in the United States is that it still has the SES differences I 
highlighted between Blacks and Whites. I do not believe that public policies that favor 
one group over another can necessarily close this gap; however, it appears that the macro 
political system might already favor one group over the other.
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Appendix A: Permission To Use Instrument 
To measure political competition per state, I received permission of an instrument 
developed in 2008 from Julianna Pacheco, Ph.D. on 4/23/2012 through email. Below is 
the transcript:
Ori g i na l  E-mai l
Hi Trevor,
I apologize for my late response. I was at a conference last week and 
am just now getting caught up on email. I'd be happy to share my 
measure of political competition.
Did you want it for the state or zlpcode level?
Let me know!
Julie
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:03 AM, Trevor Smith
> Hi Dr. Pacheco,
>
> I am currently in the proposal stage of my dissertation and have come 
across
> your measure of political competition from your article: Political
> Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political
> Competition on Youth Voter Turnout.
>
> I was wondering if I could get permission from you to use that 
measure. I'm
> attempting to see how political competition might affect median Black
> household incomes, if at all.
>
> Thank you for your time,
>
> Trevor Smith, M.A.
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Appendix B: IRE Approval Letter
Dear Mr. Smith,
This email is to serve as your notification that Walden University has approved BOTH your 
dissertation proposal and your application to the Institutional Review Board. As such, you are 
approved by Walden University to conduct research.
Please contact the Office of Student Research Administration at research@waldenu.edu if you 
have any questions.
Congratulations!
Jenny Sherer
Operations Manager, Office of Research Ethics and Compliance
Leilani Endicott
IRB Chair, Walden University
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Appendix C: IRB Approval Number
Dear Mr. Smith,
This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved your 
application for the study entitled, "Relationships Between Political Competition and 
Socioeconomic Status for a Continually Underserved Population: An Analysis of Political 
Competition in the 50 United States."
Your approval # is 08-08-12-0182323. You will need to reference this number in your 
doctoral study and in any future funding or publication submissions.
Your IRB approval expires on August 7, 2013. One month before this expiration date, 
you will be sent a Continuing Review Form, which must be submitted if you wish to 
collect data beyond the approval expiration date.
Your IRB approval is contingent upon your adherence to the exact procedures described 
in the final version of the IRB application document that has been submitted as of this 
date. If you need to make any changes to your research staff or procedures, you must 
obtain IRB approval by submitting the IRB Request for Change in Procedures Form.
You will receive confirmation with a status update of the request within 1 week of 
submitting the change request form and are not permitted to implement changes prior to 
receiving approval. Please note that Walden University does not accept responsibility or 
liability for research activities conducted without the IRB's approval, and the University 
will not accept or grant credit for student work that fails to comply with the policies and 
procedures related to ethical standards in research.
When you submitted your IRB application, you made a commitment to communicate 
both discrete adverse events and general problems to the IRB within 1 week of their 
occurrence/realization. Failure to do so may result in invalidation of data, loss of 
academic credit, and/or loss of legal protections otherwise available to the researcher.
Both the Adverse Event Reporting form and Request for Change in Procedures form can 
be obtained at the IRB section of the Walden web site or by
emailinqirb@waldenu.edu: http://inside.waldenu.edU/c/Student Facultv/StudentFacultv 
4274.htm
Researchers are expected to keep detailed records of their research activities (i.e., 
participant log sheets, completed consent forms, etc.) for the same period of time they 
retain the original data. If, in the future, you require copies of the originally submitted 
IRB materials, you may request them from Institutional Review Board.
Please note that this letter indicates that the IRB has approved your research. You may 
not begin the research phase of your dissertation, however, until you have received 
the Notification of Approval to Conduct Research e-mail. Once you have received 
this notification by email, you may begin your data collection.
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Both students and faculty are invited to provide feedback on this IRB experience at the 
link below:
http://www.survevmonkev.com/s.aspx?sm=qHBJzkJMUx43pZeqKlmdiQ 3d 3d
Sincerely,
Jenny Sherer, M.Ed., CiP 
Operations Manager
Office of Research Ethics and Compliance
Email: irb@waidenu.edu
Fax: 626-605-0472
Tollfree : 800-925-3368 ext. 1341
Office address for Walden University:
100 Washington Avenue South 
Suite 900
Minneapolis, MN 55401
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